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Judicial Independence
at Twilight
Charles Gardner Geyh†
Abstract
Judicial independence is a fixture of American government, but its
structure has never been fully understood. As long as the federal
judiciary has survived episodic attacks with its independence intact,
there has been no pressing need to know how or why. But a confluence
of cyclical, sustained, and sudden developments now threatens the
federal judiciary’s autonomy in arguably unprecedented ways and
demands a more comprehensive analysis of judicial independence and
its vulnerabilities. This article begins by reconceptualizing the
structure of judicial independence in three tiers. At the apex is an
ancient, Rule of Law Paradigm, which proceeds from the premise that
independence enables judges to set extralegal influences aside and
impartially uphold the law. In the middle tier is Article III of the U.S.
Constitution, via which the framers implemented the Rule of Law
Paradigm in a rudimentary way. At the base tier are informal
constitutional conventions that emerged over time to fill gaps in the
constitutional design and guide the political branches in their
relationship with the courts in a manner consistent with Article III and
the overarching paradigm. Next, the article explains how this threetiered structure came into being, how it evolved, later eroded, and how
it recently began to collapse with the repudiation of judicialindependence conventions in a neo-populist age that is sweeping the
globe. It attributes the long-term erosion of support for judicial
independence to the crumbling Rule of Law Paradigm and its
increasingly antiquated premise that independent judges impartially
uphold the law, unsullied by ideological and other influences. It
recommends a gradual shift to what I call a Legal Culture Paradigm,
which reframes and defends the role of judicial independence in a
government with a judiciary whose judges are deeply acculturated to
take law seriously but who are nonetheless subject to extralegal
†
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influences at the margins, where operative law is indeterminate. It
argues, however, that a reboot of the prevailing paradigm cannot, by
itself, quiet the fury firing the ongoing, neo-populist assault on judicial
independence, because the judiciary and its autonomy have become
little more than pawns subject to sacrifice in a high-stakes chess game
played by polarized, partisan political leaders for the future of American
Democracy. The article concludes that realistic hope for an accord that
restores judicial-independence conventions, guided by a new paradigm,
must follow a period of destabilizing, no-holds-barred, partisan combat,
in much the same way that settlement in contentious civil cases can
often be achieved only after a period of exhausting and unrestrained
hardball litigation.
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Introduction
Judicial politics has recently morphed from a board game to a full
contact sport. In 2016, Democrats accused the Republican Senate
majority of stealing a Supreme Court seat after the Senate refused to
schedule a hearing for President Obama’s nominee, Merrick Garland,
thereby preserving the vacancy for President Trump to fill.1 The next
year, the Republican Senate majority exercised the “nuclear option” of
stripping the minority of power to filibuster Supreme Court confir–
mations, after the Senate Democratic majority did the same to their
Republican counterparts in lower court confirmation proceedings six
years earlier.2 In 2017, the Chairman of the Federalist Society’s Board
of Directors coauthored a memo to Congress urging it to double the
size of the circuit courts and pack them with conservative partisans,
while Democratic leaders have since proposed to increase the size of the
Supreme Court and pack it with liberal partisans when they return to
power. 3 For his part, President Trump campaigned to discredit the
“disgraceful” and “political” machinations of “so-called” judges and
“Obama judges” who issued rulings impeding his initiatives, prompting
an extraordinary rebuke by the Chief Justice, and a retaliatory flurry
of counterpunches from the President.4
Legal scholars have responded to this “crisis of legitimacy” with an
array of “radical” recommendations.5 Examples include proposals to:

1.

Erick Trickey, The History of “Stolen” Supreme Court Seats, Smithsonian
Magazine (Sept. 25, 2020), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/
history-stolen-supreme-court-seats-180962589/ [https://perma.cc/YJ6D-Q
T8E].

2.

Glenn Thrush, Senate Republicans Go “Nuclear” to Speed Up Trump
Confirmations, N.Y. Times (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/04/03/us/politics/senate-republicans-nuclear-option.html [https://
perma.cc/U374-FE4U].

3.

Linda Greenhouse, A Conservative Plan to Weaponize the Federal Courts,
N.Y. Times (Nov. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/23/opin
ion/conservatives-weaponize-federal-courts.html [https://perma.cc/H3QS-2
AQJ] (discussing Federalist Society proposal); Burgess Everett & Marianne
Levine, 2020 Dems Warm to Expanding Supreme Court, Politico (Mar.
18, 2019, 5:04 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/03/18/2020-dem
ocrats-supreme-court-1223625 [https://perma.cc/4L Y3-8PBW].

4.

See infra Part III.B.3.

5.

Amanda Frost, Academic Highlight: Epps and Sitaraman on How to Save
the Supreme Court, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 18, 2018, 4:15 PM), https://
www.scotusblog.com/2018/12/academic-highlight-epps-and-sitaraman-onhow-to-save-the-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/U8KV-JZAV].
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limit the terms of the Court’s justices;6 subject the justices to popular
election; 7 establish an explicitly partisan Court comprised of half
Democrats and half Republicans8; and select a rotating Supreme Court
by lottery drawn from the ranks of the lower courts.9
These are fascinating and provocative proposals that force us to
rethink the role of the Supreme Court in American government. As
radical proposals, however, their prospects for implementation are poor,
which effectively relegates them to the realm of thought experiments.
Moreover, with exceptions, scholars have fixated on challenges curr–
ently confronting the Supreme Court with insufficient heed to the
broader context in which those challenges have arisen. This broader
context embraces the structure, history, culture and politics of an
independent judiciary—including but not limited to the Supreme
Court—an appreciation for which is critical to charting a more nuanced
and practical course forward that I propose here.
Judicial independence has been a defining feature of the American
Constitutional landscape for centuries. It has been theorized in light of
its objectives, taxonomized with reference to its forms, and described
in relation to its conjoined twin, judicial accountability. The structure
of judicial independence, however, has never been fully explained or
understood. As long as the foundations of judicial independence have
remained sound and the structure has been adequate to support the
weight of episodic attacks, there has been no urgent need to fully
understand why or how. But that is changing due to developments that
are variously cyclical, sustained, and (as described at the outset of this
article) sudden. These developments threaten the future of an
independent judiciary in unprecedented ways, and counsel the need for
a deeper and more systematic evaluation of judicial independence and
its vulnerabilities that this article seeks to supply.
The powers that the U.S. Constitution delegates to the three
branches of government enable each branch to make the others
miserable. If he were so inclined, the President could decline to execute
congressional enactments, defy court orders, and deploy the military to
consolidate his power. Congress could slash appropriations to the
executive and judicial branches and impeach insubmissive Presidents
and judges. The judiciary could drive the executive and legislative
6.

Richard Davis, Electing Justice: Fixing the Supreme Court
Nomination Process 175 (2005).

7.

Id. at 174.

8.

Eric J. Segall, Eight Justices Are Enough: A Proposal to Improve the
United States Supreme Court, 45 Pepp. L. Rev. 547, 550 (2018).

9.

Daniel Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, How to Save the Supreme Court, 129
Yale L.J. 148, 181–84 (2019).
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branches into constitutional crisis via unbridled resort to judicial
review.
Apocalyptic scenarios such as these have materialized rarely, if
ever. Proceeding from James Madison’s premise that “[a]mbition must
be made to counteract ambition,”10 the framers embedded checks and
balances into the constitutional design to equip each branch with the
means to thwart attempted usurpations of power by the other two,
which, the theory goes, have operated as a deterrent.
That said, those who peddled the proposed Constitution to the
fledgling states did not conceive of the three branches as coequal in
power. Rather, Alexander Hamilton characterized the judiciary as
“least dangerous” because it possessed powers of neither sword nor
purse. 11 In the abstract, Hamilton would seem to be right: if one
conjured a new “Survivor” reality television series involving three
contestants, each with an exclusive power—one who could shoot things,
one who could buy things, and one who could declare things—the smart
money would not ride on the survival of declare-things guy. A
competitor who snubs the guy who shoots things, or the guy who buys
things, risks being shot or starved; but the guy who declares things can
be ignored with impunity unless one or both of the other two has his
back.
To the extent that the judiciary has emerged, evolved, and endured
as a separate, independent, and ultimately powerful branch of
government, despite its vulnerabilities, it is because the people and the
public officials who represent them have collectively willed it to be so.
The collective will is embodied in a deeply rooted Rule of Law Paradigm
that has guided the framing of the U.S. Constitution and structured
the judiciary’s role in relation to the other branches of government.
That paradigm, in a nutshell, posits that judges who are afforded
independence from the so-called “political” branches will exercise
judicial power by setting aside extralegal influences and impartially
upholding the law in their capacity as courts.12
The Rule of Law Paradigm acknowledges that judges should be
accountable to Congress (in extreme situations) for treason, bribery,
and other high crimes and misdemeanors, via the impeachment process.
It accepts that judges should be accountable to “the law,” in the sense
that their decisions are subject to appellate processes, constitutional
amendments, legislative overrides, oaths of office, and the dictates of
conscience. But the paradigm’s conception of accountability is sharply
limited and does not envision that judges should be answerable to the

10.

The Federalist No. 51, at 268 (James Madison) (George W. Cary &
James McClellan eds., 2001).

11.

The Federalist No. 78, at 402 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Cary
& James McClellan eds., 2001).

12.

See infra, Section II.B. (discussing the Rule of Law Paradigm).
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public or political branches for the choices they make, which would be
antithetical to the independent judiciary that the Rule of Law
Paradigm seeks to protect and promote.
The Rule of Law Paradigm maps on a constitutional structure
strewn with gaps and ambiguities that the political branches could
exploit to impose their will on the judiciary in a manner contrary to
the paradigm’s tenets. To complement the Rule of Law Paradigm, then,
an array of conventions has evolved over time to fill gaps, clarify
ambiguities, and structure the exercise of political branch power in a
manner consistent with the paradigm and Article III, which together
give rise to a custom of respect for judicial independence.
In Part I of this article, I overview the structure of judicial
independence, beginning with a synopsis of the provisions in the U.S.
Constitution that bear on the relative independence and accountability
of judges and the federal judiciary. These provisions are akin to a list
of parts for a machine that is unaccompanied by instructions for
assembly. And so, I supplement the parts list with a corollary to an
instruction manual that explains how these parts are assembled into a
three-tiered structure (organized by tiers moving from general to
specific). On the top tier of that structure is the Rule of Law Paradigm
that conceptualizes the role of judicial independence in American
government. On the second tier is the U.S. Constitution, with its
limited provision for an independent judiciary, the meaning of and
support for which are guided and sustained by the overarching
paradigm that the constitution embodies. On the third tier are consti–
tutional conventions informally established and applied by the political
branches over time. These conventions fill gaps in the constitutional
design and provide additional protection for judicial independence
consistent with the paradigm. Taken together, these discrete
conventions have given rise to a custom of respect for the judiciary’s
autonomy, or “customary independence,” that the political branches
have, for the most part, respected.
In Part II, I trace the history of judicial independence across periods
of establishment, evolution, and erosion. During the period of
establishment (which I denominate Judicial Independence 1.0), the
framers aspired to create an independent judiciary in Article III of the
U.S. Constitution. Due to inattention and inexperience, however, they
did not fully appreciate the extent to which other powers that the
Constitution delegated to Congress and the President could be
exploited to undermine the independent judiciary they sought to
establish.
During the period of evolution (Judicial Independence 2.0),
beginning in the early nineteenth century, discrete independence
conventions emerged and evolved to constrain political branch
encroachments on the judiciary’s autonomy, in a manner consistent
with the overarching Rule of Law Paradigm. These conventions came
to deter congress from retaliating against judges for unpopular rulings
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by means of impeachment, budget cuts, salary freezes, or court-packing.
They gave rise to standard operating procedures in judicial
confirmation proceedings that encouraged deliberation and compro–
mise, to the end of promoting a stable and independent judiciary
deserving of public confidence. And they discouraged Presidents from
openly defying court orders and undermining the judiciary’s legitimacy
for partisan gain.
During the period of erosion, beginning in the early twentieth
century (Judicial Independence 3.0), the emerging social science of
judicial decision-making, the changing politics of federal judicial
appointments, and the shifting media coverage of the courts, have
combined to render judges’ professed imperviousness to extralegal
influences increasingly hypocritical-seeming, to the detriment of public
confidence in the Rule of Law Paradigm. This period of erosion
manifested a new skepticism of judicial autonomy driven by an
emerging concern that independence is less a shield from external
sources of intimidation that enables judges to uphold the law, than a
weapon that insulates judges from accountability and enables them to
disregard the law and substitute their ideological and other preferences.
Part III describes the dawn of a new era—a period of convention
collapse (Judicial Independence 4.0). If the period of erosion was a slowburning brush fire that encroached on the Rule of Law Paradigm
gradually over time, then the period of collapse is a Molotov cocktail
that exploded in the age of Trump, and blew open a door to a more
populist form of leadership that has little patience for an independent
judiciary obstructing its agenda.
The era of convention collapse in Judicial Independence 4.0 is not
about President Trump per se. It is about democracy fatigue, born of
growing dissatisfaction with American government generally, which
contributes to disenchantment with the judiciary. It is about antielitism, which has fueled distrust of the career politicians and lifetenured, “expert” judges responsible for a government increasingly
viewed as broken. It is about a wave of neo-populism that world leaders
(including but not limited to Donald Trump) are riding, in which
democracy fatigue and anti-elitism have buoyed popular support for
self-proclaimed men or women of the people, who have consolidated
executive power by punishing dissent within the ranks of their own
political party and diminishing the capacity of the other branches to
keep the executive in check. And it is about political polarization, as
growing, factionalized distrust of and hatred for the opposing political
party have engendered distrust of and hatred for judges nominated and
confirmed by the opposing political party, which has undermined diffuse
support for courts generally.
Whereas the earlier period of erosion was marked by crumbling
support for the Rule of Law Paradigm, the new period of collapse
threatens the discrete micro-conventions that comprise customary
independence. President Trump unified Republican Party support for
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a more openly partisan judiciary, which elicited an equal and opposite
reaction from congressional Democrats. As a consequence, serious
partisans on the left and right proposed to pack the Supreme and lower
courts. Senate majorities from both political parties repudiated timehonored procedural conventions that promoted consensus and compro–
mise in confirmation proceedings. The President, in turn, abrogated a
convention against attacking the legitimacy of the federal courts and
flirted with challenging a convention against defying Supreme Court
orders.
For one who respects the role of an independent judiciary in a
tripartite system of government, the period of erosion during Judicial
Independence 3.0 was troubling, and the period of collapse in Judicial
Independence 4.0 is alarming. These two stages in the development of
judicial independence have different causes and effects but are related
in an important way. Eroding support for judicial independence in the
Rule of Law Paradigm—the defining feature of the period of erosion—
has enabled independence conventions to topple in the era of collapse
by weakening the foundation upon which those conventions have rested.
Accordingly, Part IV calls for a two-track approach to reform. One
track remediates long-term erosion of support for an independent
judiciary in the Rule of Law Paradigm. The second track addresses the
latest assault on judicial-independence conventions.
With respect to the first track, I argue that gradual diminution of
support for judicial independence during the period of erosion in
Judicial Independence 3.0 is attributable to stress fractures in the
antiquated Rule of Law Paradigm—a paradigm that should be
jettisoned in favor of a more defensible Legal Culture Paradigm. The
Legal Culture Paradigm I propose posits that judges are acculturated
to take the law seriously—first as law students, then as lawyers, and
later as judges. The inevitability of legal indeterminacy, however,
requires judges to exercise judgment and discretion informed by a range
of extralegal influences, including the judge’s policy perspectives.
Judicial independence remains essential to a Legal Culture Paradigm,
because it enables judges to follow the law and administer justice as
they are acculturated to do, even if they are subject to extralegal
influences at the margins. Yet because the Legal Culture Paradigm
acknowledges the inevitability of extralegal influence on judicial
decision-making, it contemplates a more robust role for accountability
to ensure that judges do not abuse their independence in pursuit of
personal agendas.
As to the second track, those who have brought Judicial
Independence 4.0’s era of collapse into being include good faith actors
who are understandably doubtful of the Rule of Law Paradigm and its
premise that independent judges find facts and follow law unsullied by
extralegal influences. But they also include opportunists determined to
exploit public skepticism for tactical gain to the end of peopling the
judiciary with partisan soulmates and weakening the courts as a check
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on political-branch power. Countering forces that include ingenuous
and disingenuous actors, calls into play a strategy akin to that often
used by parties in civil litigation: hardball, followed by settlement.
Thwarting those who are hell-bent to recreate the courts in their
own partisan image or to marginalize the judiciary’s capacity to keep
Congress and the President in check leaves court defenders with no
alternative but to adopt the standard litigation tactic of fighting
hardball with hardball. Cycles of excessive, anti-court vitriol aimed at
commandeering control of the judiciary have come and gone throughout
our history and have been blunted by court defenders rising up and
fighting to protect the prevailing paradigm and the judicialindependence conventions that the paradigm has spawned against
encroachment. In the context of the ongoing era of collapse, however,
hardball in defense of an independent judiciary may require more than
defending crumbling judicial-independence conventions from further
attack. Importuning those who have caused and profited from the
collapse of independence conventions, to restore and respect the very
conventions they have flouted, is an asymmetric form of hardball that
is destined to fail because convention-busters who are indifferent, if not
hostile, to customary independence have no incentive to yield.
Consequently—and this is more of a prediction than a recommen–
dation—things must get worse before they can get better. The neopopulist political right, which has consolidated power in part by
overriding judicial-independence conventions for partisan gain, is
unlikely to relent unless and until the center-left pushes back in equal
and opposite measure, creating a convention vacuum that is too chaotic
(and too inimical of independence norms) for either side to sustain.
Hardball on this order of magnitude is perilous and exhausting, and
makes a companion, litigation-like strategy of pursuing negotiated
settlement increasingly attractive. To that end, I propose a series of tribranch summits—a proposal with ancient roots dating back to James
Madison’s failed proposal for a Council of Revision—for the purpose of
diminishing inter-branch schisms, restoring paths of communication,
and rebuilding independence conventions, guided by the proposed Legal
Culture Paradigm. It is premature to convene tri-branch summits until
the disputants are receptive to listening to each other and discussing
the prospects for accord. There is, however, cause for cautious optimism
that the current appeal of the biblical edict, “[an] eye for [an] eye,”13
will eventually yield to the wisdom of a warning attributed to Mahatma
Gandhi, that “an eye for an eye leaves the whole world blind.”14
Judicial independence is in a “twilight” that can precede either
darkness or dawn. If the long and recently accelerated campaign to
curtail judicial independence is left uncorrected, a gradual fade to black
13.

Leviticus 24:19–21.

14.

Fred R. Shapiro, The Yale Book of Quotations 269–70 (2006).
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seems likely, and perhaps desirable, insofar as the erosion and collapse
of an independent judiciary signifies that it has outlived its usefulness.
To the extent, however, that judicial independence can, and as argued
here, should, be revitalized with a modified paradigm and a restoration
of constitutional conventions following period of turmoil, the prospects
for a brighter future improve significantly.

I. The Structure of Judicial Independence15
The structure of judicial independence in the federal courts is a
topic best addressed in two stages. The obvious starting place is with
the text of the U.S. Constitution and its provisions for an independent
and accountable judiciary. It quickly becomes clear, however, that
confining a discussion of judicial independence to the Constitution alone
is inadequate to explain judicial independence and its scope because
gaps in the constitutional structure could be exploited to obliterate an
independent judiciary in all but name only. The second stage in the
analysis thus requires that the Constitution be understood as part of a
more elaborate architecture, sandwiched between the Rule of law
Paradigm that animated the constitutional design and less formal
constitutional conventions that implemented the constitutional design
in light of the prevailing paradigm.
A. The Constitutional Structure and its Gaps

When it comes to the federal judiciary’s independence and account–
ability, the conventional starting point in the analysis is the United
States Constitution.
The “independence” side of the ledger includes: 1) the good
behavior clause, which guarantees judges tenure during “good
[b]ehaviour” and thereby insulates them from independence-threatening
reappointment or reelection; 16 2) the compensation clause, which
deprives Congress of the power to constrain judicial independence via
retaliatory cuts to judicial salaries;17 3) the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment, which guarantees litigants a hearing before an

15.

In an important article entitled The Architecture of Judicial Independence,
Professor Stephen Burbank discusses the theoretical underpinnings of
judicial independence in relation to judicial accountability. Stephen B.
Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 S. Cal. L. Rev.
315, 339–40 (1999). I use the term “structure,” in lieu of “architecture” here,
to describe the tiered structures that promote and protect judicial
independence.

16.

U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.

17.

Id. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
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independent judge;18 4) the suspension clause, which buffers the federal
courts from political branch encroachment by prohibiting suspension of
federal court authority to issue writs of habeas corpus, except “when in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it;” 19
5) the judicial power clause, which grants the federal courts a monopoly
on judicial power that offers the judicial branch a measure of indepen–
dence from political branch encroachment on judicial functions;20 and
6) structural separation of government into three independent (if also
interdependent) branches.21
On the accountability side are congressional powers: 1) to impeach
and remove judicial officers, which Alexander Hamilton, writing as
Publius, characterized as the primary means the Constitution supplied
to ensure the “responsibility” of judges; 22 2) to establish (and by
negative implication, disestablish) inferior courts, which has been
construed to authorize congressional regulation of court practice,
procedure, administration, structure, and size, each of which can
conceivably be used as carrots or sticks;23 3) to regulate the Supreme
Court’s appellate jurisdiction, which arguably subsumes the authority
to constrain an uncooperative Court’s judicial power;24 4) to tax and
spend in relation to the judiciary’s budget and salary increases;25 and
5) to implement the foregoing powers by means “necessary and
proper,” which arguably authorizes supplemental powers to constrain
or control.26 In addition, the Constitution delegates to the Senate the
power to consent to the appointment of federal judges, which enables
it to exercise a form of prospective accountability by limiting the
judicial workforce to judges it deems capable, qualified, and likely to
render decisions the Senate regards as politically acceptable.27
18.

Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and
the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 Yale L.J. 455, 476 (1986); U.S.
Const. amend. V.

19.

U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.

20.

Id. art. III, § 1.

21.

Id. art. I–III. See also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation
of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 393, 415–19
(1996).

22.

The Federalist No. 79, at 409 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Cary
& James McClellan eds., 2001).

23.

U.S. Const. art. III, § 1; Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1941);
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472–74 (1965).

24.

U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.

25.

Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.

26.

Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.

27.

Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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The President, in turn, has two powers germane to judicial
accountability: 1) “[t]he” executive power, paired with the duty to
“take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” which give the
President the raw power, if not the constitutional authority, to enforce
or marginalize court orders as he sees fit and defy those he deems
unconstitutional;28 and 2) the power to nominate judges, which, like
the Senate power to confirm judicial nominees, gives the President a
form of prospective accountability that enables him to limit the pool of
future judges to those who are more likely to be simpatico and less
likely to get in his way.29
Making sense of the balance the Constitution strikes between
judicial independence and accountability is compromised by questions
the drafters and their boosters left unresolved. Five examples illustrate
the challenge.
First, in Federalist 79, Alexander Hamilton opined that
impeachment is the “only provision on the point [concerning ‘pre–
cautions’ for the ‘responsibility’ of judges] which is consistent with the
necessary independence of the judicial character, and is the only one
which we find in our own constitution in respect to our own judges.”30
James Madison’s notes of the constitutional convention reveal that the
delegates devoted almost no debate to the impeachment clauses in
relation to judges. 31 During the ratification debates, Federalists and
Anti-Federalists agreed that impeachment would be available to deter
or remedy “deliberate usurpations” of judicial power animated by
“wicked or corrupt motives.”32 They likewise agreed that impeachment
would not address “errors in judgment,” or “misconstructions and
contraventions of the will of the legislature”—a state of affairs that
bothered the Anti-Federalist Brutus, but not the Federalist Hamilton.33
No one, however, discussed the possibilities that Congress could
encroach on judicial independence by mischaracterizing errors as
usurpations, by disregarding the distinction altogether, or by using
threats of impeachment to intimidate.
Second, Article III, Section 1, which delegates to Congress the
power to establish lower federal courts (or not), was a compromise
28.

Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; id. art. II, § 3.

29.

Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.

30.

Federalist 79, supra note 22, at 409–10.

31.

James Madison, Notes (Aug. 27, 1787), in 2 The Records of the
Federal Convention of 1787, at 426–28 (Max Farrand ed., 1937).

32.

The Federalist No. 81, at 420 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Cary
& James McClellan eds., 2001); Brutus, The Power of the Judiciary (Mar.
20, 1788), in The Antifederalist Papers 222–24 (Morton Borden ed.,
1965).

33.

Brutus, supra note 32; Federalist 81, supra note 32.
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between those delegates who wanted to enshrine inferior federal courts
in the Constitution and those who wanted no such courts at all. 34
Whether the power to establish courts included the powers to
disestablish such courts and constrain their institutional autonomy
through regulation (for example, by manipulating court practice,
procedure, structure, size, administration and jurisdiction), was an issue
left for later generations to untangle.
Third, the framers understood that they had denied the judiciary
the power of the purse, which, in Hamilton’s view, rendered the
judiciary less “dangerous.”35 But there is no indication that the framers
considered the extent to which congressional power to manipulate
judicial budgets could encroach on independence in ways comparable
to manipulating the salaries they thought to protect.
Fourth, at the constitutional convention, the delegates devoted
considerable debate to the implications of dividing the appointment
power between President and Senate.36 But no thought was publicly
expressed to suggest that the President’s power to nominate or the
Senate’s power to confirm could be used to constrain decisional
independence by extracting views, if not assurances, from nominees as
to how they would decide future cases as judges.
Fifth, it was self-evident that the Necessary and Proper Clause
empowered Congress to determine the size of the Supreme Court
because the Constitution established a Supreme Court without
specifying the number of justices to comprise it.37 But the possibility
that the power to control Court size included the power to manipulate
the composition of the Court’s decision-making majority appears not to
have been considered.
Embarking on the constitutional adventure with these issues
unresolved, and often unrecognized, created an array of quasi-political
questions for Congress and the President to answer over time. I use
“quasi-political questions” to signify those issues that may or may not
be nonjusticiable per se, but which, for reasons related to text,
precedent, institutional competence, inter-branch comity, and political
prudence, the courts have afforded Congress and the President a
heightened degree of interpretive deference. Congressional oversight of
the federal courts is awash in such questions. The Supreme Court has
expressly denominated questions concerning congressional inter–
34.

Charles Gardner Geyh, When Courts & Congress Collide: The
Struggle for Control of America’s Judicial System 43 (2006)
[hereinafter When Courts & Congress Collide].

35.

Federalist 78, supra note 11.

36.

James Madison, Notes (June 5, 1787), in 1 The Records of the Federal
Convention of 1787 119–22, 126 (Max Farrand ed., 1937).

37.

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.; id. art. III, § 1.
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pretation of the impeachment clauses “political;” 38 deferred to
congressional regulation of court practice and procedure as plenary;39
acceded to legislation directing justices of the Supreme Court to serve
as roving trial judges, given the Court’s “practice and acquiescence”
under the statute for the preceding fourteen years; 40 genuflected to
legislation effectively removing circuit judges by disestablishing their
courts because “there are no words in the constitution to prohibit or
restrain the exercise of legislative power” to establish inferior
tribunals;41 acquiesced to Congress’s authority to thwart judicial review
by stripping the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to hear a pending case;42
and abided by statutes subjecting the Supreme Court to disqualification
standards and financial disclosure rules, despite what the Chief Justice
has characterized as the uncertain constitutional status of such
measures.43
B. The Three-Tiered Structure of Judicial Independence

If Congress were so inclined, then, these quasi-political interpretive
spaces would seem to afford it the discretion to destroy the judicial
independence that the framers thought they were creating. What does
tenure during good behavior achieve if Congress can disestablish an
uncooperative judge’s office or arbitrarily characterize her behavior as
an impeachable crime and have her removed? What is the benefit of a
salary that cannot be diminished if Congress can eliminate a judge’s
operating budget, deny her cost-of-living adjustments, or double her
workload? That said, the limits of Congress’s constitutional authority
to manhandle the courts remains uncertain because the successful
attempts have been old and few, which raises the question of why.
The answer begins prior to the establishment of the Constitution,
with an emerging conceptual model or paradigm of the government that
the founding generation sought to establish and operationalize
imperfectly in its charter. The persistence of that model has enabled
later generations to fill gaps and resolve ambiguities in the
38.

Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 233 (1993).

39.

Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 473–74; Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S.
1, at 9–10.

40.

Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803).

41.

Id.

42.

Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514–15 (1869) (“We are not at liberty to
inquire into the motives of the legislature. We can only examine into its
power under the Constitution; and the power to make exceptions to the
appellate jurisdiction of this court is given by express words.”).

43.

2011 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary 6–7 (2011),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2011year-endreport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M5EC-F8G5].
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constitutional structure via constitutional conventions, in a manner
more or less consistent with the overarching paradigm.
I have previously referred to this model as “the Rule of Law
Paradigm” (ROLP).44 The rule of law, in its most rudimentary form,
proceeds from the premise that people enjoy certain fundamental rights
that are better protected by a fixed body of self-imposed laws than by
the whims of an autocrat. In the West, the rule of law germinated from
seeds planted by the ancient Greeks that went dormant following the
collapse of the Roman Empire, blossomed anew during the High Middle
Ages and Renaissance, and returned to full flower during the Enlighten–
ment with the writings of John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and
Charles Montesquieu, among others.45 Those writers, in turn, influenced
the thinking of those who framed the U.S. Constitution.46 The ROLP,
as I describe it here, is a model that guided the framers of the U.S.
Constitution and their successors on how best to implement the rule of
law.
With respect to the judiciary, the framers sought to implement a
ROLP in a rudimentary way. They meant to equip the judiciary with
the means to uphold the law on a case-by-case basis by establishing a
separate judicial branch armed with exclusive authority to exercise
“the” judicial power.47 They meant to protect federal judges from public
and political branch intimidation—thereby enabling them to set
extralegal influences aside and uphold the law—by providing for federal
judges to be appointed, rather than elected, and affording them
independence via special tenure and salary protections.48 To keep the
other branches in check, those who lobbied the states to ratify the
proposed constitution argued that the judicial power federal courts
exercise would include the power to declare acts of the other branches
unconstitutional.49 And in anticipation of the concern that life-tenured
judges might abuse the power of judicial review, cheerleaders for the
proposed Constitution argued that the threat of impeachment operated
as an adequate cross-check.50
44.

Charles Gardner Geyh, Courting Peril: The Political Transfor–
mation of the American Judiciary 16–23 (2016).

45.

Brian Z. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics,
Theory 51, 53–54 (2004).

46.

Id. See also David M. Kirkham, European Sources of American
Constitutional Thought Before 1787, 3 U.S. A.F. Acad. J. Legal Stud.
1, 17–22 (1992) (describing the impact of European thinkers on the
American framers).

47.

U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.

48.

Id.

49.

See Federalist 78, supra note 11.

50.

See The Federalist No. 65 (Alexander Hamilton).
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Two hundred and thirty years later, the judiciary’s role in the
ROLP, and the centrality of judicial independence to that role, are oft
repeated as a virtual mantra. “The strength of our democracy and the
maintenance of the rule of law lie in the independence and impartiality
of our judiciary,” Former American Bar Association President Paulette
Brown has declared.51 U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer has
elaborated that “judicial independence revolves around the theme of
how to assure that judges decide according to law, rather than
according to their own whims or to the will of the political branches of
government.” 52 Wisconsin Chief Justice and past President of the
Conference of Chief Justices, Shirley Abrahamson, has echoed that
“‘judicial independence’ embodies the concept that a judge decides cases
fairly, impartially, and according to the facts and law, not according to
whim, prejudice, or fear, the dictates of the legislature or executive, or
the latest opinion poll.”53 There are many others.54
Although the framers codified the emerging ROLP in the
Constitution—a point that modern-day paradigm boosters never tire of
repeating—they did so incompletely and imperfectly. To fill gaps and
clarify ambiguities, constitutional conventions emerged and evolved
over time to guide Congress and the President in their resolution of
quasi-political questions in a manner consistent with the prevailing
ROLP. With qualifications, most scholars have embraced constitutional
conventions as a useful and important way for the political branches to
regularize their operations and resolve quasi-political questions that the

51.

ABA President Paulette Brown’s Statement on Judicial Independence and
Impartiality, ABA for Law Students: Student Lawyer (June 6, 2016),
https://abaforlawstudents.com/2016/06/06/statement-of-aba-President-pa
ulette-brown-on-judicial-independence-and-impartiality/ [https://perma.cc
/ZX93-GVGM].

52.

Stephen G. Breyer, Judicial Independence in the United States, 40
St. Louis U. L.J. 989, 989 (1996).

53.

Shirley S. Abrahamson, Keynote Address: Thorny Issues and Slippery
Slopes: Perspectives on Judicial Independence, 64 Ohio St. L.J. 3, 3
(2003).

54.

E.g., Samuel L. Bufford, Defining the Rule of Law, Judges’ J., Fall 2007,
at 16, 20–21 (“Judicial independence is an essential cornerstone of the rule
of law . . . .”); Julie A. Robinson, Judicial Independence: The Need for
Education About the Role of the Judiciary, 46 Washburn L.J. 535, 544
(2007) (“Judicial independence is itself a necessary prescriptive for undue
influence or external pressures on decision-making.”); Louraine C. Arkfeld,
The Rule of Law and an Independent Judiciary, Judges’ J., Fall 2007, at
13 (“A review of the literature reveals little disagreement about the basic
principles that are vital to a system that guarantees an independent
judiciary and fair and impartial courts.”).
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text of the Constitution does not answer, and which are not routinely
subject to judicial gloss.55
Conventions are easiest to conceptualize and justify as a political
branch corollary to court precedent. Like court precedent, consti–
tutional conventions promote efficiency by obviating the need for the
political branches to reinvent the wheel every time they encounter the
same question that the Constitution does not answer for them. They
promote stability in government by eliminating radical uncertainty
concerning how the branches will operate in relation to the public and
each other every time there is a transition of political power. They
promote predictability for the benefit of others within and without the
government who seek to structure their affairs in anticipation of what
the political branches will or will not do. They promote institutional
wisdom, insofar as conventions enable the government to fill cracks in
the constitutional design with reference to accumulated experience and
expertise embodied in institutional norms that past generations have
deemed consistent with the guiding paradigm. By the same token, and
again like court precedent, when a given convention comes to be
regarded as unwise or outmoded, it can be rejected or replaced.
Constitutional conventions are unlike court precedent, however, in
their lack of formality. Judicial precedent is memorialized in writing by
courts that are assigned levels in a hierarchical pyramid with the
Supreme Court of the United States at its apex. The Supreme Court
has the final authority to declare with relative clarity when a precedent
is established, what that precedent is, and when it is overturned.
Constitutional conventions, in contrast, are not memorialized as such,
or voted upon. Because of their informality, disputes over constitutional
conventions focus on whether a putative convention actually exists,
what the scope of that convention is, and how seriously the given
convention should be taken.
Ivor Jennings, the godfather of constitutional-convention scholar–
ship, offered a three-part analysis for ascertaining when conventions are
born: 1) there are precedents for a given practice; 2) there are accepted
reasons for respecting those precedents; and 3) public officials follow

55.

See Richard Albert, How Unwritten Constitutional Norms Change Written
Constitutions, 38 Dublin U. L.J. 387 (2015). Albert notes that not all
conventions are created equal. For a rule-of-law regime, conventions of
“incorporation” that fill voids in the constitutional text (like the preTwenty-Second-Amendment norm limiting the President to two terms)
may be less problematic than conventions of “repudiation” that effectively
rewrite the Constitution (like sole-executive agreements that enable
Presidents to make international agreements without Senate consent
required by the treaty clause in Article II, § 2). The judicial-independence
conventions at issue here fall into the less problematic, void-filling category.
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such precedents as binding.56 Josh Chavetz and David Pozen, in turn,
have theorized that conventions die in one of three ways: 1) when they
are destroyed, via explicit flouting or repudiation; 2) when they
decompose, by gradual disuse or neglect; and 3) when they are
displaced by positive law that obliterates or formalizes a convention.57
It is one thing to opine on the life cycle of constitutional conventions
in theory and another to show how given conventions are formed, rise,
and decline. I turn to the latter task next, focusing on the rise and
decline of judicial independence micro-conventions that have formed
under the umbrella of a customary independence macro-convention, the
support for and survival of which have depended on their role in relation
to the ROLP.

II. The Establishment, Evolution, and Erosion of
Judicial Independence
Political branch conventions have emerged, evolved, and
entrenched themselves over time to fill gaps and resolve uncertainties
in the text of Article III, thereby fostering a custom of judicial
independence. Congress and the President have (with exceptions)
respected customary independence, without an explicit directive from
court orders or the text of the Constitution itself to do so. In this part
of the article, I periodize the rise and decline of judicial independence
into its first three phases: establishment; evolution; and erosion.
A. Judicial Independence 1.0: Establishment

The founding generation’s first sketch of an independent federal
judiciary was framed by aspiration, inattention, and inexperience. The
new English Americans aspired to establish a separate and independent
judiciary as a means to implement the prevailing ROLP; they were thus
devoted in principle to judicial independence and establishing a
separate judicial branch of government. 58 They were familiar with
English history and the story of English judges, their centuries of
dependence on the crown, and their hard-fought victory in the 1701 Act
of Settlement, which granted them tenure during good behavior.59 They
56.

Ivor Jennings, The Law and the Constitution 136 (5th ed. London,
1959).

57.

Josh Chafetz & David E. Pozen, How Constitutional Norms Break Down,
65 UCLA L. Rev. 1430, 1435–38 (2018).

58.

Charles Gardner Geyh & Emily Field Van Tassel, The Independence of
the Judicial Branch in the New Republic, 74 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 31, 86
(1998).

59.

Charles Gardner Geyh, Who Is to Judge? The Perennial Debate
Over Whether to Elect or Appoint America’s Judges 25–27 (2019)
[hereinafter Who is to Judge].
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were acutely aware that colonial judges did not enjoy the same
independence as their English counterparts, and included that fact
among the reasons for their declaration of independence.60 And prior to
the constitutional convention, the young states guarded against judicial
dependence on the executive branch by shifting control of judicial
selection and tenure to the legislative branch, which engendered
problematic judicial dependence on state legislatures.61 The net effect
of these developments was to create a general consensus in favor of a
separate and independent judiciary reflected in both the constitutional
convention62 and ratification debates.63
60.

Richard E. Ellis, The Jeffersonian Crisis: Courts and Politics in
the Young Republic 6 (1971) (observing that having colonial judges serve
at the king’s pleasure “met with stiff resistance from colonial legislatures
and pamphleteers”); Edward Dumbauld, The Declaration of
Independence and What it Means Today 115 (1950) (noting that in
Massachusetts, the dependence of colonial judges on the crown rather than
the state legislature for their salaries was opposed on the grounds that “it
was unconstitutional for the judges to be independent of the people and
dependent on the crown”); The Declaration of Independence para. 11
(U.S. 1776) (objecting that the King “has made Judges dependent on his
Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of
their salaries”).

61.

Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776–
1787, at 161 (1969) (“[G]iving control of the courts and judicial tenure to
the legislatures actually represented the culmination of what the colonial
assemblies had been struggling for in their eighteenth-century contests with
the Crown. The Revolutionaries had no intention of curtailing legislative
interference in the court structure and in judicial functions, and in fact they
meant to increase it.”).

62.

For example, Convention Delegate John Dickinson proposed to amend the
good behavior clause to authorize a judge’s removal by the President upon
application from both houses of Congress, but the proposal was rejected,
with John Randolph expressing the sentiments of amendment opponents
when he said it “weaken[ed] too much the independence of the Judges.”
Madison, supra note 31, at 428–29. Debate on whether to prohibit upward
adjustments to judicial salaries featured disputants on each side grounding
their argument in concern for judicial autonomy. James Madison argued
that it would be “improper even so far to permit a dependence” of judges
on Congress for pay increases. James Madison, Notes (July 18, 1787), in 2
The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, supra note 31, at
44–45. Opponents of Madison’s proposal, who won the day, argued that
given its stature as a separate and independent branch of government, “the
importance of the Judiciary will require men of the first talents: large
salaries will therefore be necessary, larger than the U.S. can allow in the
first instance.” Madison, supra note 31, at 429.

63.

Federalist 78, supra note 11, at 405 (“[N]othing will contribute so much
as this [permanent tenure of judicial offices] to that independent spirit in
the judges, which must be essential to the faithful performance of so arduous
a duty.”); Federalist 79, supra note 22, at 408 (“Next to permanency in
office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of the judges, than
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These lofty aspirations for an independent judiciary, however, were
compromised by inattention. The founders’ intellectual energy was
focused on regulating the relationship between the first and second
branches of the national government—the respective powers of
Congress and the President, and how those powers would be wielded
and constrained—which relegated the establishment of the third branch
to a relative afterthought.64 In his history of the Supreme Court, Julius
Goebel observed that the delegates’ concern for the judiciary “generally
came off with little more than an honorable mention.”65 Establishing a
separate and independent judiciary “was a matter of theoretical
compulsion rather than of practical necessity,” Goebel explained, as a
consequence of which the framers acted “more in deference to the
maxim of separation than in response to clearly formulated ideas about
the role of a national judicial system.”66
The perils of inattention were exacerbated by inexperience. Those
political branch encroachments on judicial independence with which the
framers had experience were largely limited to threats against judicial
tenure and salaries of individual judges—threats that the framers duly
countered in Article III, Section 1. A complaint embedded in the
Declaration of Independence that the King had “obstructed the Admin–
istration of Justice, by refusing his Assent to Laws for establishing
Judiciary powers,”67 was addressed by establishing a separate judicial
branch in Article III, armed with “the” judicial power. But the founders
had no practical experience with political branch encroachments on the
a fixed provision for their support.”); Brutus, supra note 32, at 223 (“I do
not object to the judges holding their commissions during good behavior. I
suppose it a proper provision provided they were made properly
responsible.”); The Federal Farmer, Letter XV: The Judiciary (Jan. 18,
1788), reprinted in Letters from the Federal Farmer to the
Republican 97, 99 (Walter Hartwell Bennett ed., 1978) (“[I]t is well
provided, that the judges shall hold their offices during good behaviour.”).
With respect to antifederalist arguments concerning the perils of
independence on judicial decision-making, see Brutus, supra note 32, at
223–24 (“[J]udges under this system will be independent in the strict sense
of the word. . . . There is no power above them that can correct their errors
or control their decisions.”).
64.

Julius Goebel, Jr., 1 History of the Supreme Court of the United
States: Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801, at 97 (1971).

65.

Id.

66.

Id. at 206.

67.

Declaration of Independence para. 10 (U.S. 1776). See Richard E.
Ellis, supra note 60, at 7 (observing that the “central problem” of the
colonial courts was trying to protect the “judiciary’s independence from the
encroachments of the Crown and Parliament”); Edward Dumbauld, supra
note 60, at 115 (explaining that Massachusetts acted swiftly to declare it
unconstitutional for judges to receive money from the crown).
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judiciary as a separate department of government because in England
and the colonies the judiciary, as an institution, was neither separate
nor independent but an extension of the Crown. 68 When, in 1787,
convention delegates created a separate judicial branch in Article III
and empowered Congress to establish inferior courts (or not), the
possibility that Congress and the President could exploit such power to
disestablish those courts, control their operations, and undermine the
judiciary’s autonomy, went unexplored, and would remain unexplored
for the next fourteen years.69
In 1801, when the outgoing Federalists were poised to transfer
power to the incoming Jeffersonian Republicans, the lame-duck
Congress and President enacted legislation reducing the size of the
Supreme Court from six members to five, and establishing sixteen new
circuit judgeships (known as the “Midnight Judges Act”).70 The very
next year, Jefferson and his Republican cohort in Congress returned the
Supreme Court to six members, and disestablished the sixteen circuit
judgeships, thereby removing their ostensibly life-tenured officeholders.71 It was a brazen, partisan move that a meek Supreme Court
upheld despite private grumbling among the justices that the legislation
was patently unconstitutional.72
For Senator William Giles, a cheerleader for the triumphant
Jeffersonian Republicans, the theory of a separate and independent
judiciary was “not critically correct,” even though it was “obvious
that the framers of our Constitution proceeded upon this theory in its
formation;” a truly independent judiciary, Giles reasoned, would be
able “to execute the peculiar functions assigned to it without the aid,
or in other words, independent of,” the other branches, which “is not
68.

Scott Douglas Gerber, A Distinct Judicial Power: The Ori–
gins of an Independent Judiciary, 1606–1787, at 29–37 (2011).

69.

This inexperience was underscored after the constitutional convention,
when Virginia enacted legislation establishing district courts and directing
high court judges to staff them—legislation that the Virginia Court of
Appeals invalidated as an unconstitutional encroachment on its judicial
independence. At the Virginia ratification debate over the U.S.
Constitution, Patrick Henry applauded his state court’s decision, but
wondered aloud: “Are you sure that your federal judiciary will act thus? Is
that judiciary as well constructed, and as independent of the other branches,
as our state judiciary?” Patrick Henry, Statement at the Virginia
Ratification Convention (June 12, 1788) in 3 The Debates in the
Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal
Constitution 313, 325 (Jonathan Elliot ed. 1863).

70.

Jed Glickstein, Note, After Midnight: The Circuit Judges and the Repeal of
the Judiciary Act of 1801, 24 Yale J.L. & Humans. 543, 543–44 (2012);
Judiciary Act of 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89.

71.

Geyh & Van Tassel, supra note 58, at 78–85.

72.

Id. at 82–83.
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the Constitutional character of our Judicial department.”73 The separ–
ate and independent judiciary that the framers had been committed to
establishing on paper was on the brink of obliteration in practice.
B.

Judicial Independence 2.0: Evolution

The Midnight Judges Act and its repeal was a fork in the road for
judicial independence. The path Giles had cleared envisioned a future
without any meaningful autonomy for judges or the courts, in which
Congress could and would control the judiciary by “remov[ing] . . . all
its executive officers indiscriminately,” via impeachment and disestab–
lishment.74 That, however, would be the road not taken.
Over the course of the next hundred and fifty years, a series of
conventions would emerge, evolve, and entrench to guide Congress and
the President. Such conventions would caution against initiatives that
might threaten the independent judiciary so essential to the prevailing
ROLP, which the framers aspired to protect in their Constitution.
Making the case for the existence of constitutional conventions is tricky
business under the best of circumstances, given their informality. It is
especially difficult with judicial-independence conventions because the
primary evidence of their existence is often the absence of action—the
steps inimical to judicial independence that Congress or the President
could have taken but did not. Sometimes, evidence of the reasons for
political branch inaction takes the helpful form of statements offered
by elected officials, which explicitly link inaction to respect for a given
judicial-independence convention. In the absence of such statements, a
judicial-independence convention can only be inferred from an
uninterrupted course of conduct compatible with a convention that
cannot readily be explained on other grounds. Making the case for
conventions of the latter type is more problematic, insofar as supporting
evidence is entirely circumstantial. Ironically, however, conventions
that enjoy silent acquiescence may be more robust, to the extent that
explicit statements in defense of a convention tend to be necessary only
when the convention is vulnerable to attack.
1. Congressional Conventions

Convention Against Impeaching Judges for Their
Decisions: Senator William Giles’ campaign against judges appointed
by Federalist Presidents included an initiative to remove them via
impeachment; and while he succeeded with Judge John Pickering,
Pickering was more than a strident Federalist—he was an insane and

73.

17 Annals of Cong. 114, 114–15 (1808) (statement of William Giles).

74.

Letter from William Giles to Thomas Jefferson (March 16, 1801), reprinted
in Dice Robins Anderson, William Branch Giles: A Study in the
Politics of Virginia and the Nation from 1790 to 1830, at 77 (1914).
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alcoholic strident Federalist.75 That made it easier to remove Pickering
but at the expense of making it harder to cite his impeachment as
precedent for removing judges who had fallen from political favor.76 The
Jeffersonian-Republicans then impeached Supreme Court Justice
Samuel Chase because of his partisan pronouncements from the bench,
but failed to convict him in the Senate, where the implications for
judicial independence of removing a judge who issued problematic
rulings was not lost on the prevailing Senate faction.77 In the years since
Chase was acquitted, alleged abuse of judicial decision-making power
has been among the charges featured in petitions for the impeachment
of over thirty federal judges, precisely none of whom was removed on
that basis.78 By 1986, the Chair of the House Judiciary Committee’s
Subcommittee on Courts declined to investigate such matters, reporting
categorically that “impeachment does not apply to judicial decisionmaking” because “[i]t would be a great irony if the protections found in
the Judiciary’s constitutional charter—Article III—did not shield
judges in their decisionmaking role.”79
Convention Against Removing Judges Via Disestablish–
ment of Courts: Giles successfully exploited Congress’s power to
establish inferior courts as authority to disestablish an entire tier of
federal courts and remove their officeholders. The Midnight Judges Act
and its repeal would indeed set a precedent for the future, but not the
one Giles had in mind, for it became a precedent to avoid rather than
follow. Over the course of the nineteenth century, as Congress enlarged
the judicial workforce to accommodate westward expansion, it became
increasingly solicitous of the judiciary’s institutional independence and
reliably suspicious of proposals to revamp lower court structure, which
were repeatedly rejected with negative reference to the ham-handed
Midnight Judges Act and its repeal.80 The convention against this form
of court packing and unpacking became so entrenched that never again

75.

Emily Field Van Tassel & Paul Finkelman, Impeachable Offenses:
A Documentary History from 1787 to Present 91 (1999).

76.

Id. at 92.

77.

When Courts & Congress Collide, supra note 34, at 131–42.

78.

The analysis is complicated by the fact that judges targeted for impeachment
are often subject to multiple charges, including but not limited to abuse of
judicial power. Some judges were impeached and acquitted; some were
impeached and resigned; and some were investigated and resigned. But none
after Pickering were impeached and removed for highhanded decisionmaking. Id. at 120–24 tbl.1.

79.

Findings and Conclusions of Robert W. Kastenmeier on Citizen Petitions
to Impeach Three Federal Judges (Sept. 25, 1986) (on file with the author).

80.

Id. at 61–65.
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would Congress disestablish courts as a means to remove Article III
judges from office.81
Convention Against Partisan Manipulation of Supreme
Court Size: Congress’s practice of retaining the basic structure of the
federal courts established by the Judiciary Act of 1789—a practice
expressly followed throughout most of the nineteenth century out of
respect for the judiciary’s status as a separate and independent branch
of government—can fairly be described as a convention in its own
right. 82 In 1891, that convention yielded (though not without a
protracted fight) to caseload pressures, when Congress established a
new system of circuit courts of appeals.83 But longstanding respect for
the structure of the 1789 Act birthed a related convention against
partisan manipulation of Supreme Court size. The 1789 Act established
a system of circuits and district courts below the Supreme Court, with
each Supreme Court justice assigned to oversee (and ride) one of the
enumerated circuits.84 With the exception of the notorious Midnight
Judges Act of 1801, repealed the next year, in which the outgoing
Federalist Congress sought to deprive incoming President Jefferson of
an appointment by reducing the size of the Supreme Court from six
justices to five, the size of the Supreme Court expanded in lockstep
with the establishments of new circuits in the western states until 1866,
when Congress shrank the Supreme Court from ten justices to seven.85
One possibility is that Reconstruction era Republicans unpacked
the Court to deny Democratic President Andrew Johnson multiple
81.

In 1913, Congress disestablished the short-lived Commerce Court which, in
the minds of the majority who voted for its obliteration, had been corrupted
by commercial interests as evidenced by the impeachment and removal of
Commerce Court Judge Robert Archbald the previous year. Despite
profound antipathy toward the Commerce Court and significant support
for removing its judges, Congress preserved the judges’ offices when it
disestablished the court, with the repeal of the Midnight Judges Act serving
as a negative precedent. Id. at 81–85.

82.

Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. See generally When Courts &
Congress Collide, supra note 34, at 51–111 (discussing Congress’s
century-long reluctance to disrupt the structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789
out of deference to the negative precedent set by the Midnight Judges Act
and its repeal).

83.

Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826. See generally Felix
Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Business of the Supreme
Court (1928).

84.

Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.

85.

When Courts & Congress Collide, supra note 34, at 68. For a
discussion of the Midnight Judges Act and its repeal, see Center for the
Study of the American Constitution, Midnight Appointments in Judiciary
Politics, October 23, 2020, https://csac.history.wisc.edu/2020/10/23/mid
night-appointments-in-judiciary-politics/ [https://perma.cc/8SJB-848S].
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appointments. 86 This, however, is a dubious extrapolation from the
available evidence. First, President Johnson signed the bill, which he
would be unlikely to do if the measure was a partisan gambit to
diminish his power.87 Second, there is a more prosaic explanation for
the bill: Chief Justice Salmon Chase had proposed that Congress shrink
the size of the Court to accommodate a salary increase for the remaining
justices. 88 Third, the bill passed with virtually no debate or
explanation—hardly the mark of a contentious power grab by one party
to deprive the other of prized appointments. 89 Fourth, a contem–
poraneous account observed that “[t]here seems to have been no serious
opposition to the law, which was in no sense a political measure,
however much political feelings may have aided its passage.”90 Three
years later, Congress increased the Court from seven to nine justices as
part of an omnibus court reform package,91 which restored traditional
correspondence between the number of circuits and justices, and the
Court has remained at nine in the years since. Some argue that the
failure of Franklin Roosevelt’s 1937 Court-packing plan established a
new convention against further changes to Court size, 92 but it also
represented the application of a much more deeply rooted convention
against manipulating Supreme Court size for openly partisan purposes.
Qualified Conventions Against Constraining Judicial
Independence Via Congressional Manipulation of Judicial
Budgets, Salaries, and Workforce: Congress is not above playing
games with the judiciary’s budgets, salaries, and judgeships. Congress
is more generous with its appropriations to the judiciary when its
partisan orientation and that of the courts are aligned.93 In the hopes
86.

Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 83, at 72.

87.

Stanley I. Kutler, Reconstruction and the Supreme Court: The Numbers
Game Reconsidered, 32 J.S. Hist. 42, 43 (1966).

88.

6 Charles Fairman, History of the Supreme Court of the United
States: Reconstruction and Reunion, 1864-88 (pt. I) 167–68
(1971).

89.

Id. at 169.

90.

1 American Law Review 1866–1867, at 206 (Boston, Little, Brown,
and Co. 1867). The possibility that this contemporaneous account was a
work of revisionism written by a bill supporter intent on concealing its
partisan motivations is belied by the author’s criticism of the measure on
the merits. Id. at 207.

91.

Act of Apr. 10, 1869, ch.22, § 1, 16 Stat. 44.

92.

Chafetz & Pozen, supra note 57, at 1440.

93.

Eugenia F. Toma, A Contractual Model of the Voting Behavior of the
Supreme Court: The Role of the Chief Justice, 16 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ.
433, 442 (1996) (“The larger the difference between the Court [ideological]
output rating and the preferred output of Congress . . . the smaller the
budget.”).
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of improving the prospects for giving itself a raise, Congress has linked
increases in judicial salaries to increases in its own salaries—a failed
gambit that has left judicial salaries to stagnate.94 In a related episode,
federal judges took Congress to court and prevailed in 2014, after
Congress withheld cost-of-living adjustments to federal judges that it
had previously authorized.95 Bills creating new judgeships are likelier to
pass when the same political party controls Congress and the White
House,96 and such bills often include unnecessary judgeships in states of
influential legislators, which can best be explained as a perk of power.97
Such shenanigans notwithstanding, Congress has never exploited
these powers to subjugate the judiciary. It has never slashed the
judiciary’s operating budget in retaliation for unpopular judicial
decisions, as many state legislatures have.98 Congress has not wielded
its power to grant or withhold salary increases to punish or reward
judges for their decision-making, and when congressional outliers
propose to manipulate judicial salaries or budgets in these ways, the
ensuing rebukes and inaction illuminate an underlying convention
against such practices.99 In 1801, the Midnight Judges Act expanded
the judicial workforce for arguably partisan purposes, 100 but in the
modern era, proposed new judgeships are supported by nonpartisan
workload data supplied by the Judicial Conference,101 which has the
94.

See Russell R. Wheeler & Michael S. Greve, How to Pay the Piper: It’s
Time to Call Different Tunes for Congressional and Judicial Salaries,
Issues in Governance Stud. (Special Edition), April 2007, at 1, 1.

95.

James Rowley, Federal Judges in Cost-of-Living Suit Collect a 14 Percent
Raise After Years of Legal Battles, Wash. Post (Jan. 16, 2014), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/federal-judges-in-cost-of-living-suit-colle
ct-a-14-percent-raise-after-years-of-legal-battles/2014/01/16/c06ee214-7eda
-11e3-93c1-0e888170b723_story.html [https://perma.cc/8ZQG-GQ35].

96.

John M. De Figueiredo & Emerson H. Tiller, Congressional Control of the
Courts: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Expansion of the Federal
Judiciary, 39 J.L. & Econ. 435, 460 (1996).

97.

Ann Pelham, Biden Takes Judiciary to Task, Legal Times, July 2, 1990,
at 7.

98.

American Bar Association, Justice in Jeopardy: Report of the
American Bar Association Commission on the 21st Century
Judiciary 40–43 (2003).

99.

Representative Steve King on Federal Budget Issues, C-SPAN (Mar. 16,
2011), https://www.c-span.org/video/?298525-5/representative-steve-king
-federal-budget-issues [https://perma.cc/D5JE-TK2Z].

100. Landmark Legislation: Judiciary Act of 1801, Fed. Jud. Cent.,
https://www.fjc.gov/history/legislation/landmark-legislation-judiciaryact-1801 [https://perma.cc/2NHK-G7KM] (last visited Feb. 10, 2021).
101. See Barry J. McMillion, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R45899, Recent
Recommendations by the Judicial Conference for New U.S.
Circuit and District Court Judgeships: Overview and Analysis
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effect of exposing unnecessary judgeships as highly visible exceptions to
a convention against such manipulations.102
Procedural Conventions in Judicial Confirmation
Proceedings: The grounds upon which federal judges are nominated
and then confirmed or rejected have always been openly partisan and
unconstrained by conventions against intruding upon the prospective
independence of nominees.103 The President and Senate did, however,
adopt procedural conventions (some memorialized as Senate rules) that
fostered deliberation, compromise, and consensus in the confirmation
process, which promoted an independent judiciary indirectly. The
tradition of “senatorial courtesy,” which began in the 1830s, called upon
Presidents to confer with same-party Senators from a prospective
district court nominee’s home state, and defer to the Senators’
recommendations. 104 The so-called “blue-slip” procedure enabled a
nominee’s home-state senator to block a vote on the confirmation—a
process that in practice added a layer of consultation and cooperation
before a nomination could proceed.105 Cloture rules empowered as few
as forty-one Senators to kill a confirmation by means of a filibuster,
which incentivized Presidents to nominate judges who enjoyed
10–11 (2019) (describing the process that the Judicial Conference
Subcommittee on Judicial Statistics employs to assess judgeship needs with
reference to workload factors). See also Deborah J. Barrow, Gerard S.
Gryski & Gary Zuk, The Federal Judiciary and Institutional
Change 93–94 (1996) (describing the “expertise” relevant to the Judicial
Conference’s role as “initiator” of judgeships legislation in the modern era).
The judiciary can manipulate the workload data to serve its own
institutional interests, but that is a separate concern that does not implicate
Congressional encroachment on the judiciary’s independence. See, e.g.,
Stephen B. Burbank, S. Jay Plager & Gregory Ablavsky, Leaving the
Bench, 1970-2009: The Choices Federal Judges Make, What Influences
Those Choices, and Their Consequences, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 37–38
(2012) (discussing the factors considered by judges taking ‘senior status,’
such as creating a vacancy).
102. Id.
103. See generally Henry J. Abraham, Justices, Presidents, and
Senators: A History of the U.S. Supreme Court Appointments
from Washington to Bush II (5th ed. 2008) (arguing that “political and
ideological compatibility” between President, Senate and Justice has been
demonstrably important in Supreme Court appointments).
104. Stephen B. Burbank, Politics, Privilege, and Power: The Senate’s Role in
the Appointment of Federal Judges, 86 Judicature 24, 26 (2002); See
Jessie Kratz, The Origins of Senatorial Courtesy, National Archives:
Pieces of History (Aug. 3, 2014), https://prologue.blogs.archives.
gov/2014/08/03/the-origins-of-senatorial-courtesy/ [https://perma.cc/K
MJ4-HW57].
105. Brannon P. Denning, The “Blue Slip”: Enforcing the Norms of the
Judicial Confirmation Process, 10 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 75, 76
(2001).
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bipartisan acquiescence, if not support. 106 Beginning in the 1950s,
Presidents called upon the American Bar Association to review nominee
qualifications, which facilitated broader consensus in support of the
ABA’s nonpartisan recommendations and bolstered the credibility of
nominees deemed qualified.107 In promoting deliberation, consensus, and
compromise, these rules cultivated a stable selection process, which
yielded a judicial workforce that (with exceptions) enjoyed broad-based
support—a workforce that, in the public’s mind, could be trusted with
its independence.
2. Presidential Conventions

Convention Against Openly Defying Court Orders: As a
matter of constitutional principle, the President’s obligation to comply
with direct orders of the U.S. Supreme Court, consonant with the
principle of checks and balances, is all but universally accepted.108 It is
just as universally understood, however, that the President possesses
the raw political power to defy a direct order, and that the Supreme
Court is helpless to force compliance if he does.109 But true defiance,
when the President openly flouts a Supreme Court order directing him
to take specified action, has occurred only once, when, in the midst of
the Civil War, Lincoln activated the suspension clause and refused to
106. See, e.g., Betsy Palmer, Cong. Rsch. Serv., RL31948, Evolution of
the Senate’s Role in the Nomination and Confirmation Process:
A Brief History 13–15 (2008) (discussing the first clear-cut example of
successful filibuster against a judicial nomination). For an overview on
Senate procedures on filibuster and cloture, see Valerie Heitshusen &
Richard S. Beth, Cong. Rsch. Serv., RL30360, Filibusters and
Cloture in the Senate (2017).
107. Statement of ABA President Hilarie Bass Re: ABA Judicial Evaluations,
American Bar Association (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.americanbar.
org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives/2017/11/statement_of_abapre/
[https://perma.cc/V7SZ-K2Z7].
108. Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of
Constitutional Interpretation, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 1267, 1313–14 (1996)
(“[E]very modern departmentalist scholar has maintained that the President
has an obligation to enforce specific judgments rendered by federal courts,
even when the President believes that the judgments rest on erroneous
constitutional reasoning.”) (footnotes omitted). But see Michael Stokes
Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the
Law Is, 83 Geo. L.J. 217, 283 (1994)(“There is no general power of courts
to issue direct orders to the President that the President is constitutionally
obliged to obey . . . .”).
109. Lee Epstein & Eric A. Posner, The Decline of Supreme Court Deference to
the President, 166 U. Pa. L. Rev. 829, 832 (2018). For a general discussion
of court orders and presidential defiance, see Tara Leigh Grove, The Origins
(and Fragility) of Judicial Independence, 71 Vand. L. Rev. 465, 488–93
(2018).
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comply with a writ of habeas corpus in the teeth of a Supreme Court
order that he do so.110
Explanations for why Presidents do not defy court orders share a
common theme introduced in the opening paragraphs of this article: the
Constitution works because we will it to work. The ROLP has created
a powerful default in favor of Presidential compliance with Court
orders. The reservoir of legitimacy that an independent judiciary enjoys
renders defiance a perilous course for Presidents in all but the most
extraordinary circumstances. 111 And the Supreme Court has acted
strategically by issuing orders against Presidents infrequently and
under circumstances in which the Court has an airtight rationale that
deprives Presidents of plausible arguments for defiance.112 One scholar
has described the resulting “obligation of governmental officials to obey
judicial orders,” as possibly “the most important convention of all.”113
With the crisis-breeding option of brazenly defying direct court orders
rendered effectively nonviable, Presidents and courts have confined
their skirmishes over compliance to matters of degree, and, on rare
occasion, enforcement of Supreme Court orders issued against other
parties.114
Qualified Convention against Rhetoric that Delegitimizes
the Courts: There are innumerable examples of Presidents taking
exception to judges, courts and judicial decisions, with colorful criticism
of judges and judicial decisions making occasional appearances in offthe-record remarks. 115 Delegitimizing rhetoric, in contrast, which
110. James A. Dueholm, Lincoln’s Suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus:
An Historical and Constitutional Analysis, 29 J. Abraham Lincoln Ass’n
47 (2008). See also U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
111. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicial Supremacy, Departmentalism, and the
Rule of Law in a Populist Age, 96 Tex. L. Rev. 487, 507 (2018).
112. Id. at 507–08. See also Michael J. Gerhardt, Presidential Defiance and the
Courts, 12 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 67, 71 (2018) (providing Nixon as an
example of when a President thought better of defying a Supreme Court
order). But see Epstein & Posner, supra note 109, at 832 (explaining
presidential power in the Supreme Court).
113. James G. Wilson, American Constitutional Conventions: The Judicially
Unenforceable Rules That Combine with Judicial Doctrine and Public
Opinion to Regulate Political Behavior, 40 Buff. L. Rev. 645, 674
& n.128 (1992).
114. See, e.g., David Janovsky & Sarah Turberville, The President v. The
Courts, POGO (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.pogo.org/analysis/2018/
02/president-v-courts/ [https://perma.cc/P67Y-6UBX] (describing how
President Nixon agreed to obey a “definitive” decision from the Supreme
Court, suggesting that he would not have complied with something less, or
with an order from a lower court).
115. See Todd S. Purdum, Presidents, Picking Justices, Can Have Backfires,
N.Y. Times (July 5, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/05/
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challenges the legitimacy of judges by attacking their integrity or
accusing them of usurping power in derogation of their duty to uphold
the law, is quite rare. Thomas Jefferson once characterized the federal
courts as a “subtle corps of sappers and miners constantly working
under ground to undermine the foundations of our confederated
fabric”—but did so in private correspondence, after he had left office.116
Andrew Jackson had his quarrels with the Marshall Court, but did not
publicly challenge the Court’s legitimacy or impugn its integrit. 117
Abraham Lincoln warned that “if the policy of the Government . . . is
to be irrevocably fixed by the decisions of the Supreme Court, . . . the
people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent
practically resigned their Government into the hands of that eminent
tribunal”—but sandwiched that observation between statements
emphasizing his support for the Court and respect for its rulings.118
Richard Nixon observed that “[w]hen you look at what the United
States Supreme Court has done to hamper law enforcement . . . I
politics/politicsspecial1/presidents-picking-justices-can-have-backfires.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/FY2X-DGRR].
116. Jefferson on the Supreme Court, N.Y. Times (June 23, 1861),
https://www.nytimes.com/1861/06/23/archives/jefferson-on-the-supremecourt.html [https://perma.cc/LTX5-YNB9].
117. Jeffrey Rosen, Not Even Andrew Jackson Went as Far as Trump in
Attacking the Courts, The Atlantic (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.the
atlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/02/a-historical-precedent-for-trumps-at
tack-on-judges/516144/ [https://perma.cc/M86Q-UNKW]. Jackson vetoed
a bill re-chartering the National Bank because he deemed it uncons–
titutional, notwithstanding that the Supreme Court upheld the validity of
the original charter, explaining that it was his duty to “decide upon the
constitutionality of any bill,” independently of the Court. Id. Jackson may
have questioned the limits of judicial supremacy, but he did not defy a
Court order and cannot fairly be characterized as attacking the Court’s
legitimacy or integrity. When, in response to a later Court ruling, Jackson
reportedly said that “John Marshall has made his decision, now let him
enforce it,” one might infer a more menacing threat to the Court’s authority
and legitimacy—but the best available evidence is that Jackson never made
the statement. See id.
118. Mr. Lincoln and the Supreme Court, N.Y. Times (Mar. 7, 1861),
https://www.nytimes.com/1861/03/09/archives/mr-lincoln-and-the-suprem
e-court.html [https://perma.cc/38V6-9HWR]. Immediately before making
the quoted statement, Lincoln said that he did not “deny that [constitutional
questions decided by the Supreme Court] must be binding in any case upon
the parties . . . while they are also entitled to very high respect and consi–
deration in all parallel cases by all other departments of the Government.”
Id. Immediately after the quoted statement, Lincoln added, “[n]or is there
in this meant any assault upon the Court or the Judges. It is a duty from
which they may not shrink to decide cases of property brought before them,
and it is no fault of theirs if others seek to turn their decisions to political
purposes.”
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wonder if we truly have representative government anymore”—but he
said that as a candidate, before he became President.119
The convention against delegitimizing rhetoric, however, should be
qualified by the anti-Court campaign of Franklin Roosevelt. FDR’s
campaign was prompted by a series of Supreme Court decisions that
invalidated legislation integral to FDR’s New Deal agenda—an agenda
that sought to combat the Great Depression by expanding the role of
the federal government in the economic recovery.120 FDR railed that the
Court had usurped power, by “cast[ing] doubts on the ability of the
elected Congress to protect us against catastrophe,” and again, by
“improperly set[ting] itself up as a third house of the Congress . . .
reading into the Constitution words and implications which are not
there, and which were never intended to be there.”121 After the Court
upheld a piece of New Deal legislation, he impugned the dissenters’
allegiance to the country and Constitution, accusing them of concluding
that “the right under a private contract to exact a pound of flesh was
more sacred than the main objectives of the Constitution to establish
an enduring Nation.”122 As a consequence of these alleged usurpations,
he argued that the Court could not be trusted, declaring that “we must
take action to save the Constitution from the Court and the Court from
itself.”123 Such statements are undeniably a break from the convention
of restraint in Presidential criticism of the Court. It bears emphasis,
however, that Roosevelt was a convention-breaker extraordinaire. He
attacked the Court like no other, tried to pack the Court like no other,
expanded the role of the federal government in American life like no
other, and was the first and only President in history to defy the twoterm convention and seek a third term in office.124 Moreover, context is
key to understanding FDR’s role as convention-breaker, which occurred
amid the back-to-back, protracted national emergencies of the Great
Depression and World War II. 125 Therefore, FDR may fairly be
119. Chris Hickman, Courting the Right: Richard Nixon’s 1968 Campaign
against the Warren Court, 36 J. Sup. Ct. Hist. 287, 287 (2011).
120. David E. Kyvig, The Road Not Taken: FDR, the Supreme Court, and
Constitutional Amendment, 104 Pol. Sci. Q. 463, 464–65 (1989).
121. Fireside Chat on Reorganization of the Judiciary (NBC radio broadcast
Mar. 9, 1937).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See L.A. Powe, Jr., Two Great Leaders, 57 N.Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 465
(2012); FDR’s Third-Term Election and the 22nd Amendment, Nat’l
Const. Ctr.: Const. Daily (Nov. 5, 2020), https://constitutioncenter.
org/blog/fdrs-third-term-decision-and-the-22nd-amendment [https://per
ma.cc/V6BB-CK6M].
125. His abrogation of conventions against Court packing, delegitimizing
rhetoric, and a limited national government arose out of his campaign to
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characterized as sui generis—an outlier whose exceptional attacks upon
the legitimacy of the Supreme Court highlight the prevalence of an
underlying rule or convention against the practice that other Presidents
have respected under all but the most exigent circumstances.
The many and varied conventions summarized here proceeded from
a common premise: that they were needed to constrain powers that the
President and Congress might otherwise exploit to undermine judicial
independence in ways antithetical to the ROLP that the framers sought
to implement in their Constitution. This cluster of conventions
comprises a broader custom of political branch respect for the judi–
ciary’s autonomy that I have previously denominated “customary
independence.” 126 Customary independence is not grounded in some
naïvely optimistic belief that political branch actors stay their hand out
of altruistic admiration for the judiciary’s freedom from encroachment.
Rather, customary independence is a biproduct of the deep-seated
legitimacy that the judiciary enjoys with the public that the political
branches serve, which renders political-branch power grabs at the
expense of the judiciary’s autonomy a perilous strategic ploy.127
The emergence and entrenchment of customary independence
bespeaks a form of judicial branch exceptionalism. There are myriad
constitutional conventions that regulate how the executive and
legislative branches conduct their own affairs and interact with each
other. But conventions regulating relationships with the judiciary are
different: they represent a conglomeration of related practices that fill
a sizable hole in the constitutional design of a branch of government
that the framers left gaping through inexperience and benign neglect.
Without customary independence, the political branches could comply
with the tenure and salary protections of Article III but still bring the
judiciary to its knees by exploiting other powers at their disposal, in
derogation of the ROLP that the framers sought to implement. In other
words, constitutional conventions are instrumental to the efficient
operation of the political branches in relation to the other branches, but

combat the Great Depression, as discussed here, while his decision to run
for a third term was attributable to the onset of World War II. Richard
Moe, Why (and How) FDR Ran for His Third Term, Hist. News
Network (Aug. 12, 2013), https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/152895
[https://perma.cc/U8V7-GHCB].
126. Charles Gardner Geyh, Customary Independence, in Judicial
Independence at the Crossroads 160, 162–63 (Stephen Burbank &
Barry Friedman eds., 2002).
127. For example, Professor William Ross explains the cool reception FDR’s
Court-packing plan received in Congress, with reference to grassroots
opposition to the President’s encroachment on the judiciary’s autonomy.
William G. Ross, A Muted Fury: Populists, Progressives, and
Labor Unions Confront the Courts, 1890–1937, at 1 (1994).
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they are essential to the very survival of a separate and independent
judiciary.
C.

Judicial Independence 3.0

During Judicial Independence 2.0, independence norms gradually
evolved into discrete conventions that collectively comprised customary
independence. The road to customary independence was bumpy.
Judicial-independence conventions often emerged between or during
cycles of anti-court sentiment that challenged judicial-independence
norms and sometimes threatened their survival.128 But over the course
of the nineteenth and into the twentieth centuries—the heyday of
Judicial Independence 2.0—these cycles of court-directed hostility ac–
quired a distinct pattern. Each cycle began in the aftermath of a major
transition of political power—following the ascent of the Jeffersonian
Republicans in 1801; the Jacksonian Democrats in 1829; Reconstruction
Republicans in 1865; Progressive Reformers in the 1890s; the New
Dealers in 1933; Richard Nixon (whose election culminated a campaign
against the Warren Court) in 1969; and congressional Republicans in
1995. Leaders of each new regime, disgruntled by decisions of judges
left behind by the former regime, would then propose to constrain the
independence of the holdover judges. Court defenders, armed with
judicial-independence conventions, would challenge and thwart court
critics; holdover judges would act strategically to reduce unnecessary
confrontations; judges appointed by the new regime would gradually
replace holdover judges as they retired, and the cycle would wind
down.129
The longevity of customary independence is attributable to the
ROLP, which guided both the formation of the Constitution itself, and
the independence conventions that emerged to fill spaces in the
constitutional text in a manner consistent with the paradigm.
Beginning in the 1920s, however, a slowly gathering confluence of
developments in social science, federal judicial appointments, state
judicial elections, media coverage of courts, and public opinion, began
to challenge assumptions core to the ROLP—most notably, the
assumption that independent judges set extralegal influences aside and
impartially uphold the law.

128. When Courts & Congress Collide, supra note 34, at 51–52.
129. Charles Geyh, The Choreography of Courts-Congress Conflicts, in The
Politics of Judicial Independence 19, 21 (Bruce Peabody ed., Johns
Hopkins Univ. Press 2011).
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1. Legal Realism and the Rise of Social Science

The legal realism movement of the 1920s did not challenge the
relevance of law to judicial decision-making, per se,130 but did challenge
legal determinacy. Proponents of the new “realistic jurisprudence,”
argued that empirical study was essential to understanding the choices
judges made, because those choices could not be explained with
reference to operative law alone.131
Beginning in the early 1940s, dissenting and concurring opinions on
the Supreme Court increased in frequency.132 That enabled an emerging
cohort of political scientists to compare the ideological orientations of
justices in the majority and dissent to the end of showing that the
choices the justices made correlated with their preexisting ideological
preferences. In the 1960s, Glendon Schubert dubbed this the
“attitudinal model,” because it explained voting patterns on the
Supreme Court with reference to the underlying attitudes of the
justices.133 By the 1990s, Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth declared the
attitudinal model triumphant and the legal model “meaningless,” 134
while other political scientists relegated the relevance of law in Supreme
Court decision-making to the status of myth.135 In the early 2000s, a
team of law professors and political scientists showed that a computer
model, which incorporated attitudinal factors into its analysis and took
no account of the specific legal issues at stake, was better able to predict
the outcomes of cases in a pending Supreme Court term than a panel
of legal experts.136 In the years since, academic lawyers and political
scientists have shifted focus to federal courts of appeal, where they have

130. Brian Z. Tamanaha, A Realistic Theory of Law 24–26 (2017).
131. Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 Colum.
L. Rev. 431, 444 (1930).
132. Cass R. Sunstein, Unanimity and Disagreement on the Supreme Court, 100
Cornell L. Rev. 769, 771 (2015).
133. Glendon Schubert, The Judicial Mind: The Attitudes and
Ideologies of Supreme Court Justices 1946–1963, at 5–6 (1965);
Jeffrey A. Segal, Glendon Schubert: The Judicial Mind, in The Pioneers
of Judicial Behavior 78 (Nancy Maveety ed., 2003).
134. Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, the Supreme Court and the
Attitudinal Model Revisited 66 (2002).
135. John M. Scheb II & William Lyons, The Myth of Legality and Public
Evaluation of the Supreme Court, 81 Soc. Sci. Q. 928, 937–38 (2000).
136. Theodore W. Ruger, Pauline T. Kim, Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M.
Quinn, The Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and Political Science
Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 Colum. L.
Rev. 1150 (2004).
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found that attitudinal influences, while less pronounced than on the
Supreme Court, are nonetheless measurable.137
Back in the law schools, the Critical Legal Studies movement of the
1970s planted seeds for later germination of critical race and critical
feminist theories, which explored (among other things) the role that
race and gender play in the administration of justice. 138 Studies
correlating the race of the judge to rulings issued on motions to dismiss
in race-discrimination cases underscored that political ideology is not
the only extralegal influence on the decision-making of independent
federal judges.139
2. Judicial Appointments and the Ascendance of Ideology

Meanwhile, the federal judicial appointments process was evolving
on a parallel track. Supreme Court confirmation proceedings have never
been apolitical. Throughout the nineteenth century, senators frequently
offered makeweight, merits-based objections to Supreme Court
nominees that concealed more deeply partisan motives aimed at pun–
ishing nominees for past political transgressions, thwarting unpopular
Presidents, or backhanding Presidents for failing to consult with
relevant Senate leaders before making nominations.140 It was not until
1888, though, that the Senate first focused on the prospective impact
of a nominee’s ideological orientation on his future decision-making as
a basis for rejecting him—a focus that became increasingly prevalent
throughout the twentieth century, culminating in the Senate’s 1986
rejection of Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork.141 In the years since
the Bork rejection, nominee ideology has been a focus of virtually every
Supreme Court confirmation proceeding, and has moved to the front
and center of circuit and sometimes district court confirmation

137. See Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The
Behavior of Federal Judges: A Theoretical & Empirical Study
of Rational Choice 82–85 (2013); see generally Cass R. Sunstein,
David Schkade, Lisa M. Ellman & Andres Sawicki, Are Judges
Political?: An Empirical Analysis of the Federal Judiciary (2006)
(analyzing judicial behavior through statistics).
138. See generally Cortney A. Franklin & Noelle E. Fearn, Gender, Race, and
Formal Court Decision-Making Outcomes: Chivalry/Paternalism, Conflict
Theory or Gender Conflict?, 36 J. Crim. Just. 279 (2008).
139. See, e.g., Victor D. Quintanilla, Beyond Common Sense: A Social
Psychological Study of Iqbal’s Effect on Claims of Race Discrimination, 17
Mich. J. Race & L. 1, 60–61 (2011).
140. See When Courts & Congress Collide, supra note 34, at 195–204.
141. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Ideology and the Selection of Federal
Judges, 36 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 619 (2003); David J. Danelski, Ideology as
a Ground for the Rejection of the Bork Nomination, 84 Nw. U. L. Rev.
900 (1990).
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proceedings as well.142 Like the attitudinal model’s rejection of law as a
meaningful influence on Supreme Court decision-making, the Senate’s
partisan battle for ideological control of the courts cannot easily be
squared with a tenet core to the ROLP: that when deciding cases,
independent federal judges set aside their ideological predilections and
other extralegal influences and uphold the law.
As ideology became an increasingly pivotal issue in confirmation
proceedings during Judicial Independence 3.0, senators from both
political parties, keen to thwart the appointments of the opposing
party’s President, began to abuse procedural conventions in the service
of changing objectives. Scheduling hearings and floor votes on
nominees, once an unexceptional convention to promote reasoned
deliberation, was morphed into a weapon to stall and sometimes kill
nominations.143 The blue-slip procedure, which had been employed to
promote consultation between the President and a nominee’s home
state Senator, was repurposed to block nominations outright. 144
Filibusters, the threat of which had long served to encourage
compromise and consensus, were exploited by the Senate minority to
thwart nominees.145
Another procedural convention, in place since 1953,146 granted the
American Bar Association’s Committee on the Federal Judiciary early
access to administration files on prospective nominees for the purpose
of rating nominees’ qualifications on the basis of avowedly non-partisan
criteria.147 After the Committee awarded President Reagan’s Supreme
Court nominee Robert Bork a diminished (but favorable) rating in light
of his ideology, conservatives began to accuse the ABA of having a
liberal bias. 148 That suspicion was arguably corroborated by data
showing that ABA ratings of Republican nominees were lower on

142. When Courts & Congress Collide, supra note 34, at 204–08.
143. Id. at 216–17.
144. Id. at 217–18.
145. Id. at 218–22.
146. Stephanie Francis Ward, ABA Will Submit Judicial Rating for SCOTUS
Nominee Neil Gorsuch, ABA J. (Feb. 21, 2017, 1:56 PM), https://www.
abajournal.com/news/article/aba_will_submit_judicial_rating_for_sco
tus_nominee [https://perma.cc/4D6J-BF7E].
147. See Lee Rawles, Its Ratings System Under Fire, ABA Stresses Importance
of Federal Judicial Candidate Evaluations, ABA J. (Jan. 1, 2018,
1:15 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/federal_judicial
_candidate_evaluations [https://perma.cc/VM5N-5HFF].
148. The ABA’s BFF: Why Obama Wants Lawyers to Rate Judges, Wall
Street J. (Apr. 21, 2009), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1240271739
65437107 [https://perma.cc/BSS4-GTYF].
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average than for Democratic nominees149 and culminated in President
George W. Bush eliminating the ABA’s early access to nominee files.150
The ABA’s post-nomination ratings, however, continued to be
influential in the confirmation of Bush nominees, 151 and President
Obama later restored the ABA’s traditional, pre-nomination role, never
once nominating a judge that the ABA deemed “unqualified” (if only
because he had the ratings in hand before making nominations).152
3. The New Politics of Judicial Elections

In a similar vein, beginning in the 1970s, a new politics of judicial
elections morphed state supreme court races into well-funded
campaigns to remove incumbents for making unacceptable decisions on
such issues as tort reform, criminal justice, same-sex marriage, abortion,
water rights, education funding, and other ideologically charged
topics.153 These campaigns proceeded from the premise that indepen–
dent judges could not be trusted to uphold the law impartially and
needed to be controlled at the ballot box. And the data show that the
strategy works: judges dependent on voters respond to fear of defeat at

149. Susan Navarro Smelcer, Amy Steigerwalt & Richard L. Vining, Jr., Bias
and the Bar: Evaluating the ABA Ratings of Federal Judicial Nominees,
65 Pol. Rsch. Q. 827, 836 (2012). This may demonstrate a liberal bias.
Alternatively, Republican administrations have arguably demonstrated a
more robust commitment to appointing ideologically compatible judges
than their Democratic counterparts, which could translate into diminished
emphasis on qualifications relative to ideology for Republican nominees.
See Dawn E. Johnsen, Ronald Reagan and the Rehnquist Court on
Congressional Power: Presidential Influences on Constitutional Change,
78 Ind. L.J. 363, 397 (2003) (discussing Reagan administration blueprint
for reorienting constitutional law via the appointment of ideological
conservatives to the Supreme Court).
150. Ward, supra note 146.
151. Adam Liptak, White House Ends Bar Association’s Role in Vetting Judges,
N.Y. Times (Mar. 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/31/us/
politics/white-house-american-bar-association-judges.html [https://perma.
cc/YQ66-WV4K]; George W. Bush, President, United States of America,
Remarks at Hilton Cincinnati Netherland Plaza Discussing Judicial
Accomplishments and Philosophy (Oct. 6, 2008), transcript available at
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/10/2008
1006-5.html [https://perma.cc/C3VG-L9HK]; Ward, supra note 146.
152. Patrick L. Gregory, Trump Picks More “Not Qualified” Judges (1),
Bloomberg L. (Dec. 20, 2018, 2:11 AM), https://news.bloomberg
law.com/us-law-week/trump-picks-more-not-qualified-judges-1 [https://
perma.cc/A6J5-BMKF].
153. Who is to Judge, supra note 59, at 60–61, 66.
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the ballot box, ruling differently when elections are impending, by, for
example, sentencing criminal defendants more harshly.154
4. The Changing Media

In a series of developments spanning more than a generation, the
media became apostles for the gospel of an ideological judiciary. In
divided decisions, the traditional media report on Supreme Court
opinions with reference to the ideological voting blocs of justices in the
majority and dissent.155 Cable television news networks emerged in the
1980s and oriented their programming toward ideologically driven
infotainment that attacked or defended Supreme Court decisions with
reference to the pundit’s partisan inclinations.156 With the explosion of
the internet in the 1990s, non-traditional citizen journalists, unencum–
bered by fact-checking norms that regulate the mainstream media, took
to the internet and social media to attack judicial decisions they deemed
ideologically unacceptable.157
5. Public Perception

Survey data show that the public shares the views animating
Judicial Independence 3.0. Seventy-five percent of the public thinks
that “a judge’s ruling is influenced by his or her personal political views
to a great or moderate extent.”158 Fifty-eight percent agree with the
154. Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is
Justice Blind When It Runs for Office?, 48 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 247, 261
(2004).
155. Michael F. Salamone, Perceptions of a Polarized Court: How
Division among Justices Shapes the Supreme Court’s Public Image
30 (2018) (finding that Supreme Court decisions with more dissenting
justices receive more media coverage and are likelier to be framed in
ideological terms).
156. See Tom Rosentiel, Partisanship and Cable News Audiences, Pew Rsch.
Ctr. (Oct. 30, 2009), https://www.pewresearch.org/2009/10/30/parti
sanship-and-cable-news-audiences/ [https://perma.cc/S25R-SF9W].
157. For instance, the Brennan Center for Justice issued “Court Pester Awards”
on its website for several years, in response to the conservative Family
Research Council’s “Court Jester Awards.” Ken Weine, Brennan Center
Hands Out Court Pester Awards, Brennan Ctr. Just. (June 15, 1999),
https://www.brennancenter.org/press-release/brennan-center-hands-outcourt-pester-awards [https://perma.cc/ESA8-6FGK].
158. Annenberg Pub. Pol’y Ctr. of the U. of Pa., Fair and
Independent Courts: A Conference on the State of the Judiciary
3 (2006) [hereinafter Fair and Independent Courts], https://cdn.annen
bergpublicpolicycenter.org/Downloads/Releases/Release_Courts20060928
/Courts_Summary_20060928.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2X4-636W]. This
data point is arguably in tension with a more recent Annenberg survey
which found that 49% of respondents agreed with the statement that
Supreme Court justices “set aside their personal and political views and
make rulings based on the Constitution, the law, and the facts of the case.”
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statement that “[j]udges always say that their decisions are based on
the law and the Constitution, but in many cases judges are really basing
their decisions on their own personal beliefs.” 159 Fifty-seven percent
think that the Supreme Court “gets too mixed up in politics.”160 The
public regards elected judiciaries as more legitimate than appointed,161
supports judges who promise to decide cases in a manner consistent
with majority preferences,162 and is evenly divided on the question of
whether the Supreme Court should be “less independent” to ensure that
it “listens a lot more to what the people want.”163And while trust levels
in the Supreme Court appear stable and strong (relative to support for
Congress or the President) at 68%,164 that support is to no small extent
contingent, “[w]hat have you done for me lately?” support.165 In other
Most Americans Trust the Supreme Court, but Think it is Too “Mixed up
in Politics”, Annenberg Pub. Policy Ctr. of the U. of Pa. (Oct. 16,
2019) [hereinafter Too “Mixed up in Politics”], https://www.annenberg
publicpolicycenter.org/most-americans-trust-the-supreme-court-but-thinkit-is-too-mixed-up-in-politics/ [https://perma.cc/RS4A-5U4H]. While it is
possible that the public thinks Supreme Court justices are less influenced
by their political views than other judges, or that fewer people think judges
are influenced by their political views in 2019 than 2006, the better
explanation may lie with differences in how the questions were worded:
whereas a substantial majority thinks that a judge “is influenced” by her
political views, a lower percentage thinks that judges fail to “set aside” those
views, with the latter phrase implying a more conscious choice. Fair and
Independent Courts, supra, at 3; Too “Mixed up in Politics”, supra.
159. Law and Courts Questions from 2005 Poll, Campbell Pub. Affs. Inst.,
Syracuse U., https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/uploadedFiles/campbell/da
ta_sources/Law%20and%20Courts%20Questions%20from%202005%20Poll
.pdf [https://perma.cc/SBD5-NEMW] (last visited Mar. 11, 2021).
160. Too “Mixed up in Politics”, supra note 158.
161. James L. Gibson, Electing Judges: The Surprising Effects of
Campaigning on Judicial Legitimacy 107–08 (Benjamin I. Page, Susan
Herbst, Lawrence R. Jacobs & James Druckman eds., 2012) (finding that
judicial elections produce a net gain for legitimacy); see also Benjamin
Woodson, The Two Opposing Effects of Judicial Elections on Legitimacy
Perceptions, 17 State Pol. & Pol’y Q. 24, 36 (2017) (asserting that, in
states with little election activity, the legitimacy of elected courts is higher
than that of appointed courts).
162. James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Campaign Support, Conflicts of
Interest, and Judicial Impartiality: Can Recusals Rescue the Legitimacy
of Courts?, 74 J. Pol. 18, 31 (2012).
163. Too “Mixed up in Politics”, supra note 158.
164. Id.
165. Stephen B. Burbank, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, and
Interbranch Relations, 95 Geo. L. J. 909, 916 (2007) (“[T]here is reason to
fear that the distinction between support for courts irrespective of the
decisions they make (‘diffuse support’) and support depending on those
decisions (‘specific support’) will disappear. If that were to occur, the people
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words, relatively stable-seeming support for the Court is the equivalent
of still water at the surface, concealing cross-currents that shift from
administration to administration between liberal and conservative
respondents, depending on the ideological orientation of the appointing
President and the Supreme Court’s latest rulings.166
These developments in social science, Senate confirmation
proceedings, judicial elections, the media, and public opinion, are
animated by common sentiments: that courts are battlefields for control
of legal policy; that judges are ideological animals; that judicial
independence cedes control of legal policy to the ideological preferences
of judges; and that it is problematic to vest judges, rather than the
people judges serve, with the power to control legal policy. In short,
Judicial Independence 3.0 embodies a generations-long reassessment of
the principles underlying the ROLP.
The ultimate point is not that “we are all legal realists now,” as if
the public has been jostled awake from its formalist slumber by the
epiphany that judges do more (and less) than apply the law.167 To the
contrary, the public has never been so naïve as to think that judges are
impervious to extralegal influences. 168 That being so, longstanding
support for the ROLP and its premise that independent judges set
extralegal influences aside and impartially uphold the law, can best be
explained in aspirational terms, as a worthy goal. Accordingly, the
important point for purposes here is that during Judicial Independence
3.0, public perception of empirical reality became so far removed from
the assumptions undergirding the ROLP that the seeming hypocrisy of
pretending that judges are something they are not began to wear thin.

III. Judicial Independence 4.0: Collapse of Conventions
Judicial Independence 3.0 embodied an emerging skepticism of the
ROLP and its premise that independent judges hold their personal
predilections at bay and impartially uphold the law. The pace of
Judicial Independence 3.0 was glacial, spanning the better part of a
century. If this third phase in the evolution of judicial independence
progressed at a steady rate, one could anticipate that respect for the
paradigm would continue to decline, resulting in the gradual
disintegration of the discrete conventions that comprise customary
independence, and culminating in the eventual collapse of the paradigm
would ask of the judiciary not, ‘What does the law require?’ but rather,
‘What have you done for me lately?’”).
166. Id. at 915–16. See also Charles Gardner Geyh, The Supreme Court is Losing
its Luster, New Republic (Mar. 11, 2016), https://newrepublic.com/ar
ticle/131451/supreme-court-losing-luster [https://perma.cc/F7AV-TTFR].
167. See generally Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 Cal. L. Rev.
465 (1988).
168. Geyh, supra note 44, at 61–69.
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itself. But other sociopolitical changes, much broader than the
judiciary, have converged to accelerate the assault on the ROLP and
fracture customary independence, culminating in the repudiation of
several judicial-independence conventions. Welcome to Judicial
Independence 4.0.
A. The Road to 4.0

Four developments have contributed to the arrival of Judicial
Independence 4.0: democracy fatigue; anti-elitism; the rise of neopopulism; and political polarization. The relationship between these
developments and the accelerated decline of customary independence is
speculative, insofar as the causal linkage between such developments
and diminishing support for the judiciary and its autonomy is indirect.
But there is nothing speculative or indirect about the relationship
between these developments and the ascent to power of neo-populist
regimes in the United States and elsewhere. Nor is there anything
speculative or indirect about the ways in which neo-populist regimes
have consolidated power by weakening the judiciary’s check on
executive branch authority, which, in the United States, has manifested
in the repudiation of judicial-independence conventions.
1. Democracy Fatigue

In the United States, popular support for a democratic form of
government remains robust. An overwhelming majority of Americans
surveyed favor democracy over autocracy or military rule.169 There are,
however, two chinks in the armor, manifested by a deepening distrust
of the national government and deflated rates of voter participation.
First, while support for democracy is strong in principle, support
for the government that American democracy has wrought, is
not. During the unpopular Vietnam War, Lyndon Johnson withheld
facts about the progress of the war effort that engendered public
distrust of the national government. 170 That distrust deepened
169. See Richard Wike, Katie Simmons, Bruce Stokes & Janell Fetterolf,
Democracy Widely Supported, Little Backing for Rule by Strong Leader or
Military, Pew Rsch. Ctr. (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/
global/2017/10/16/democracy-widely-supported-little-backing-for-rule-bystrong-leader-or-military/ [https://perma.cc/8LV7-YFTF]; Lee Drutman,
Larry Diamond & Joe Goldman, Follow the Leader: Exploring American
Support for Democracy and Authoritarianism, Democracy Fund Voter
Study Grp. (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.voterstudygroup.org/publica
tion/follow-the-leader [https://perma.cc/4XMF-YURE].
170. Public Trust in Government: 1958–2019, Pew Rsch. Ctr. (Apr. 11, 2019),
https://www.people-press.org/2019/04/11/public-trust-in-government-195
8-2019/ [https://perma.cc/JZA8-CLVY]; Trust in Government, Gallup,
https://news.gallup.com/poll/5392/trust-government.aspx [https://perma.
cc/3MKL-BV63] (last visited Feb. 22, 2021). See also Karl Marlantes,
Vietnam: The War That Killed Trust, N.Y. Times (Jan. 7, 2017),
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precipitously in later decades, after the Watergate scandal during the
Nixon administration, 171 the Iran-Contra affair during the Reagan
administration,172 and an unpopular war in Iraq during the George W.
Bush administration.173 The net effect: the percentage of respondents
who trust the federal government all or most of the time has declined
from 77% at the beginning of the Johnson administration, to around
17% today—with data suggesting that the trust levels will continue to
decline even further.174 And among Republican voters, at least, distrust
of the government has recently devolved into distrust of the electoral
process, with only 33% of Republicans reporting that they trust U.S.
elections in the aftermath of President Trump’s defeat in 2020.175
Second, voter turnout in U.S. elections is low relative to other
democracies,176 hovering at or near 60% in Presidential election years,
and 40% in the midterms.177 Explanations vary, but three are germane
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/07/opinion/sunday/vietnam-the-warthat-killed-trust.html [https://perma.cc/58N3-MK3E]; Julian E. Zelizer,
How the Tet Offensive Undermined American Faith in Government,
Atlantic (Jan. 15, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/
2018/01/how-the-tet-offensive-undermined-american-faith-in-government/
550010/ [https://perma.cc/HP83-8U6J].
171. See Pew Rsch. Ctr., supra note 170; Gallup, supra note 170. See also
Ken Burns & Lynn Novick, How the Vietnam War Broke the American
Presidency, Atlantic (Oct. 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/maga
zine/archive/2017/10/how-americans-lost-faith-in-the-presidency/537897/
[https://perma.cc/4C67-XWZP]; Lynn Vavreck, The Long Decline of Trust
in Government, and Why That Can Be Patriotic, N.Y. Times (July 3,
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/04/upshot/the-long-decline-oftrust-in-government-and-why-that-can-be-patriotic.html [https://perma.cc
/MG7L-HWDF].
172. Distrust of Reagan Shown in Poll, N.Y. Times, May 8, 1987, at A15.
173. See Pew Rsch. Ctr., supra note 170; Trust in Government: 1958–2015,
Pew Rsch. Ctr. (Nov. 23, 2015), https://www.people-press.org/2015/11/
23/1-trust-in-government-1958-2015/ [https://perma.cc/S43M-PQSS].
174. See Pew Rsch. Ctr., supra note 170; Uri Friedman, Trust is Collapsing
in America, Atlantic (Jan. 21, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/
international/archive/2018/01/trust-trump-america-world/550964/ [https:
//perma.cc/B2G2-76RP].
175. Nick Laughlin & Peyton Shelbourne, How Voters’ Trust in Elections Shifted
After Biden Victory, Morning Consult (Jan. 21, 2021) https://morning
consult.com/form/tracking-voter-trust-in-elections/ [https://perma.cc/US8
C-YU8G].
176. Drew Desilver, In Past Elections, U.S. Trailed Most Developed Countries
in Voter Turnout, Pew Rsch. Ctr. (Nov. 3, 2020), https://www.pew
research.org/fact-tank/2020/11/03/in-past-elections-u-s-trailed-most-devel
oped-countries-in-voter-turnout/ [https://perma.cc/VQY6-FCVP].
177. See Michael P. McDonald, National General Election VEP Turnout Rates,
1789–Present, U.S. Elections Project (citing Harold W. Stanley &
Richard G. Niemi, Vital Statistics on American Politics (3rd ed.
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for purposes here: first, survey respondents report that they are too
busy to vote,178 that they do not think voting is meaningful,179 and that
they are insufficiently knowledgeable of the candidates to participate;180
second, voters lose interest and participation drops off in less
competitive races;181 and third, voter interest and participation decline
as democracies age.182 Voter turnout in the 2020 presidential election
was a record-breaking 67%, but the diminution in democracy fatigue
this uptick in turnout might otherwise reflect was offset President
Trump’s claim that the outcome was procured by fraud, which, as
noted, undermined rather than enhanced public confidence in the
democratic process among Republican voters.183

1992)), http://www.electproject.org/national-1789-present [https://perma.
cc/866E-QS5B] (last visited Mar. 11, 2021) (discussing voter turnout rates
up until 2018).
178. See Asma Khalid, Don Gonyea & Leila Fadel, On the Sidelines of
Democracy: Exploring why so Many Americans Don’t Vote, NPR (Sept.
10, 2018, 5:07 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/09/10/645223716/on-thesidelines-of-democracy-exploring-why-so-many-americans-dont-vote [https:
//perma.cc/5WYV-UGLW]; Gustavo López & Antonio Flores, Dislike of
Candidates or Campaign Issues was Most Common Reason for not Voting
in 2016, Pew Rsch. Ctr. (June 1, 2017), https://www.pewresear
ch.org/fact-tank/2017/06/01/dislike-of-candidates-or-campaign-issues-wasmost-common-reason-for-not-voting-in-2016/ [https://perma.cc/JN6Y-7L4
W]; Michael D. Regan, Why is Voter Turnout So Low in the U.S.?, PBS
(Nov. 6, 2016, 12:40 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/voterturnout-united-states [https://perma.cc/MZS9-RMUB].
179. See Khalid et al., supra note 178; see López & Flores, supra note 178.
180. See Khalid et al., supra note 178.
181. Michael D. Martinez, Why is American Turnout so Low?, in The Oxford
Handbook of American Elections & Political Behavior 107, 109
(Jan E. Leighley ed., 2010).
182. See Regan, supra note 178; see generally Filip Kostelka, Does Democratic
Consolidation Lead to a Decline in Voter Turnout? Global Evidence Since
1939, 111 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 653 (2017); Anthony George Fowler, Five
Studies on the Causes and Consequences of Voter Turnout (Mar. 2013)
(Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University), http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HU
L.InstRepos:11156810.
183. Jacob Fabina, Despite Pandemic Challenges, 2020 Election Had Largest
Increase in Voting Between Presidential Elections on Record, U.S. Census
Bureau, (Apr. 29, 2021), https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2021/
04/record-high-turnout-in-2020-general-election.html [https://perma.cc/D
EN6-LTAU]; Laughlin & Shelbourne, supra note 175.
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Relative to Congress 184 and the President, 185 the U.S. Supreme
Court enjoys stronger public support, but the Court has not been
immune to waning trust in the national government, as public
confidence in the Court dipped below 50% from 2011 to 2018.186 Public
support for the Supreme Court rallied in 2019, but that was best
explained by an uptick in contingent support from conservative
respondents in the wake of President Trump’s appointments of Justices
Gorsuch and Kavanaugh.187 And to the extent that growing distrust of
American government is attributable in part to escalating anti-elitism,
considered next, the implications for an expert, unelected, life-tenured
judiciary are clear.
2. Anti-Elitism

Diminished confidence in the American government subsumes
growing distrust of the elites at the helm of that government. Antielitism is baked into America’s DNA, beginning with the Revolution
itself—a rebellion of the people against the archetypal elite, King
George III. 188 Waves of anti-elitism have come and gone in the
generations since, 189 resurfacing aggressively in the aftermath of the
2008 recession—a recession which, in the minds of many, cast a spot–
light on the roles of wealthy elites in causing the financial crisis, and of
government elites in bailing out the well-to-do with insufficient heed to
184. See Congress and the Public, Gallup, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1600
/Congress-Public.aspx [https://perma.cc/Q4Q9-GNYB] (last visited Mar.
11, 2021) (assessing public approval of Congress).
185. See Presidential Approval Ratings—Gallup Historical Statistics and Trends,
Gallup, https://news.gallup.com/poll/116677/Presidential-approval-rati
ngs-gallup-historical-statistics-trends.aspx [https://perma.cc/94H8-DYYN]
(last visited Mar. 11, 2021); Pew Rsch. Ctr., supra note 170 (demon–
strating an overall decline in trust in the President).
186. Supreme Court, Gallup, https://news.gallup.com/poll/4732/supremecourt.aspx [https://perma.cc/KL3H-LWY2] (last visited Feb. 22, 2021).
187. See Too “Mixed up in Politics”, supra note 158; Robert Barnes, Polls Show
Trust in Supreme Court, but There is Growing Interest in Fixed Terms and
Other Changes, Wash. Post (Oct. 24, 2019, 1:52 PM), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/polls-show-trust-in-supreme-court-but
-there-is-growing-interest-in-fixed-terms-and-other-changes/2019/10/24/dc
bbcba4-f64c-11e9-8cf0-4cc99f74d127_story.html [https://perma.cc/WF3K2QR8].
188. Beverly Gage, How “Elites” Became One of the Nastiest Epithets in
American Politics, N.Y. Times (Jan. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com
/2017/01/03/magazine/how-elites-became-one-of-the-nastiest-epithets-inamerican-politics.html [https://perma.cc/CKB4-7CJU] (“The notion that
distant elites might be conspiring against the people comes straight from
the Founding Fathers . . . .”).
189. Id.
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the plight of the middle class.190 This latest iteration of anti-elitism has
targeted a range of actors including the wealthy (denominated the “top
one percent”), 191 professionals, 192 intellectuals, 193 and experts, 194
including scientists, the media, and career government officials.”195
Judges are, in many ways, consummate elites: a specialized corps
of legal experts, comprised of professionals with post-graduate degrees
who sit aloft on benches, judging the masses. This rise of anti-elitism is
to no small extent responsible for ending the mid-twentieth century
movement toward “merit selection” systems for choosing state judges,
the appeal of which was premised on the notion that expert
commissions are better equipped to assess the specialized credentials
and qualifications of expert judges, than average voters. 196 Because
190. Eric Merkley, Anti-Intellectualism, Populism, and Motivated Resistance to
Expert Consensus, 84 Pub. Op. Q. 24, 27 (2020); Matt Taibbi, Secrets and
Lies of the Bailout, Rolling Stone (Jan. 4, 2013 9:25 PM), https://www.
rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/secrets-and-lies-of-the-bailout-1132
70/ [https://perma.cc/2KWE-Y5F4].
191. Lisa A. Keister, The One Percent, 40 Ann. Rev. Sociology 347, 348
(2014).
192. Merkley, supra note 190, at 30.
193. Matt Motta, “Had Enough of Experts?” Anti-intellectualism is Linked to
Voters’ Support for Movements that are Skeptical of Expertise, London
sch. Econ. U.S. Ctr. (Aug. 30, 2017), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/
2017/08/30/had-enough-of-experts-anti-intellectualism-is-linked-to-voterssupport-for-movements-that-are-skeptical-of-expertise/ [https://perma.cc/
EQ6A-7YL9] (“[S]ince the mid-1990s, anti-intellectualism has been on the
rise in the American public, especially amongst self-identified ideological
conservatives . . . .”).
194. Id. (“The electoral successes of Donald Trump and Brexit share something
important in common. Both attempted to appeal to voters’ distrust of
expertise in rallying support for their causes.”).
195. Conor Lynch, Donald Trump’s Glorious Victory for Anti-Intellectualism:
“Drain the Swamp” Just Meant the Eggheads, salon (Jan. 7, 2017,
4:00 PM),
https://www.salon.com/2017/01/07/donald-trumps-gloriousvictory-for-anti-intellectualism-drain-the-swamp-just-meant-the-eggheads/
[https://perma.cc/NYQ2-68FM] (“For many of the millions who voted for
Trump, the “swamp” in Washington . . . denote[s] . . . arrogant tech–
nocrats, bookish intellectuals and politically correct liberal elites who are
indifferent to the struggles of the ‘forgotten men and women’ in middle
America.”); Cathleen Decker, Analysis: Trump’s War Against Elites and
Expertise, L.A. Times (July 27, 2017, 3:00 AM), https://www.latimes.
com/politics/la-na-pol-trump-elites-20170725-story.html [https://perma.cc
/J82D-WRXS] (“[F]or Trump and his allies, a war on elites has been central
to the campaign which put him in the presidency . . . . Among his targets
so far: the government’s intelligence agencies, the media, foreign allies, the
Department of Justice, establishment politicians, scientists and the
Congressional Budget Office.”).
196. Who is to Judge?, supra note 59, at 93–95.
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unelected federal judges derive legitimacy from their perceived legal
expertise, they are uniquely vulnerable to anti-elitism campaigns. As
Suzanna Sherry observes, “many people no longer see judges as
possessing legal expertise” because of attacks by “politicians, pundits,
and legal academics,” who “explicitly accus[e] the Justices of twisting
the law to serve their . . . political goals.”197
3. The Rise of Neo-populism

When a broad swath of the public becomes disillusioned with its
democracy, and distrustful of its government and the elites responsible
for making public policy, it affords an opportunity for a strong, selfproclaimed man or woman of the people to rise up and establish a more
populist form of leadership.198 The recent resurgence of populism is a
world-wide phenomenon: President Trump was among more than fortyfive populist-style leaders who have risen to power since the 1990s.199
Features common to the neo-populist leader include: striving to
dismantle the political establishment; pitting those comprising the neopopulist’s base against others in the society, differentiated along lines
of wealth, religion, race, ethnicity, or status; claiming to represent the
silent majority; blaming failures on sabotage by elites; and using simple,
direct, and sometimes boorish-seeming behavior to establish themselves
as one of the “real” people.200
Voter distrust of experts and disaffection for government as usual
correlate with a desire for a stronger, more autocratic leader, who can
wrest control from elites and reclaim government in the people’s
name.201 Once elected, neo-populist leaders have consolidated power by

197. Suzanna Sherry, Democracy’s Distrust: Contested Values and the Decline
of Expertise, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 7, 11 (2011) (emphasis in original).
198. André Munro, Populism, Encyc. Britannica, https://www.britannica.
com/topic/populism [https://perma.cc/5FL9-N5FM] (last visited Feb. 23,
2021) (defining populism as a “political program or movement that cham–
pions, or claims to champion, the common person, usually by favourable
contrast with a real or perceived elite or establishment.”).
199. Yascha Mounk & Jordan Kyle, What Populists Do to Democracies,
Atlantic (Dec. 26, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/
2018/12/hard-data-populism-bolsonaro-trump/578878/ [https://perma.
cc/GR2J-J8BH].
200. See Robert R. Barr, The Persistence of Neopopulism in Peru? From
Fujimore to Toledo, 24 Third World Q. 1161, 1162 (2003); see generally
Cas Mudde & Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism: A Very
Short Introduction 7–8 (2017).
201. See Lee Drutman, Larry Diamond & Joe Goldman, Follow the Leader:
Exploring American Support for Democracy and Authoritarianism, Voter
Study Grp. (Mar. 2018), https://www.voterstudygroup.org/publication/
follow-the-leader [https://perma.cc/2C33-86LT] (correlating disaffection
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weakening institutional checks on their authority, via (among other
strategies) stifling dissent within their own political parties, discrediting
the media, and—of particular importance here—weakening the
judiciary.202
Neo-populist regimes have weakened their respective judiciaries in
different ways. Turkey, and later Hungary, employed a two-stage
gambit: first, they expanded the jurisdiction of their high courts, which
overwhelmed court dockets; second, to address the caseload crisis
thereby created, they packed their courts with additional jurists
sympathetic to the new regime.203 Hungary took an additional approach
by lowering the mandatory retirement age for judges, thereby removing
a significant number of experienced judges in leadership roles. The new
regime replaced those judges with jurists more to its liking after
discrediting the outgoing judges as products of the Communist era.204
Poland and Egypt later adopted a similar tactic.205
4. Political Polarization

Neo-populism is divisive by design. It seeks to position the populist
leader and his insular base of ordinary folk against elites, immigrants,
the media, and anyone else who challenges the populist leader or his
agenda. To that extent neo-populism exploits and exacerbates a
polarized electorate. And in the United States, the electorate has
become increasingly polarized over the course of the past generation.
Studies show that political leaders in the United States have
recently become more polarized along ideological lines (in relation to
their diverging positions on policy issues) and affective lines (in relation
to their growing dislike for members of the opposing political party).206
With respect to the general public, the evidence does not support the
conclusion that average Americans have become demonstrably more

with government and distrust of experts with support for more autocratic
leadership).
202. Kim Lane Scheppele, Autocratic Legalism, 85 U. Chi. L. Rev. 545, 547–48
(2018).
203. Id. at 551.
204. Id. at 549–50, 553.
205. Id. at 552–54.
206. Nolan McCarty, Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and
Unequal Riches 16–70 (2006); Morris P. Fiorina & Samuel J. Abrams,
Political Polarization in the American Public, 11 Ann. Rev. Pol. Sci. 563,
565 (2008); Robert M. Faris, Hal Roberts, Bruce Etling, Nikki
Bourassa, Ethan Zuckerman & Yochai Benkler, Partisanship,
Propaganda & Disinformation: Online Media & the 2016 U.S.
Presidential Election 41 (2017); Yphtach Lelkes, Mass Polarization:
Manifestations and Measurements, 80 Pub. Op. Q. 392, 393 (2016).
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polarized in ideological terms.207 Rather, the data show that the range
of public opinion on public policy questions has remained relatively
stable over time. 208 There is, however, substantial support for the
proposition that the public has become more affectively polarized. The
percentage of Republicans who view Democrats unfavorably rose from
74% in 1994 to 91% in 2016, while the percentage of Democrats who
view Republicans unfavorably increased from 59% to 86% over the same
time frame.209 The dramatic uptick in political polarization during the
latter years of Judicial Independence 3.0 has obvious and immediate
implications for the future of judicial independence in the ROLP.
Insofar as rising antipathy for the opposing political party extends to
judges appointed by the opposing political party, conversations about
the role ideology plays in judicial decision-making morph into darker
suspicions about the influence of naked partisan politics. And if, in a
highly polarized world, judges are perceived as partisan appendages of
the President who appointed them, longstanding conventions aimed at
preserving the independence of such judges lose their reason for being.210
B. The Arrival of 4.0: Convention Collapse

Democracy fatigue, anti-elitism, and political polarization
engendered public support for a neo-populist leader in the mold of
Donald Trump.211 And consolidating executive power by weakening the
207. Morris P. Fiorina, Unstable Majorities: Polarization, Party
Sorting, and Political Stalemate 23–27 (2017).
208. Id. at 29 (“All in all, the data compiled by academic and commercial survey
organizations indicate that in broad outline the American public has
changed little in the past four decades. In the aggregate, the public today
looks much the same as the one that chose between Gerald Ford and Jimmy
Carter in 1976, well before the polarization era.”).
209. Faris et al., supra note 206, at 41.
210. Brandon L. Bartels & Christopher D. Johnston, Curbing the
Court: Why The Public Constrains Judicial Independence 6 (2020)
(“Thus, for both the left and the right, actions that threaten the Court’s
power have become fair game. . . . [O]ur book’s theory and empirical
findings—focusing on when and why the public supports such attacks on
the Court—have important implications for the extent of the Court’s
legitimacy and ultimately its independence and power in the political
system.”).
211. See Joshua J. Dyck, Shanna Pearson-Merkowitz & Michael
Coates, Primary Distrust: Political Distrust and Support for the Insurgent
Candidacies of Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders in the 2016 Primary,
51 Pol. Sci. & Pol. 351, 352–355 (2018) (attributing success of populist
candidates to government distrust); Melissa De Witte, The Great
Recession Has Influenced Populist Movements Today, say Stanford
Scholars, Stan. News (Dec. 26, 2018), https://news.stanford.edu/2018/
12/26/explaining-surge-populist-politics-movements-today/ [https://perma
.cc/TBR7-F7Y4] (crediting anti-elitism for success of Trump’s populist
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judiciary’s capacity to keep such power in check is an essential
component of the neo-populist playbook.212 With support for judicial
independence in an already weakened state during Judicial
Independence 3.0, President Trump, aided by a compliant Republican
Senate (whose compliance President Trump secured by consolidating
power within his own party—another common, neo-populist strategy213)
heralded the arrival of Judicial Independence 4.0 by abrogating judicial
independence and related conventions with unprecedented zeal. For
their part, Democratic presidential candidates and congress-members
have proposed to fight fire, which all but assures that disruption of
longstanding conventions will persist into the foreseeable future.214
1.

Dismantling Procedural Conventions in Confirmation Proceedings

Longstanding procedural conventions in judicial confirmation pro–
ceedings have collapsed. Time-honored rules and practices, weakened
from misuse and marginalization during Judicial Independence 3.0,
shattered with the arrival of 4.0.
In 2016, the Republican Senate majority took the extraordinary
step of announcing that it would exploit its control of the calendar to
deny President Obama’s Supreme Court nominee, Judge Merrick
Garland, a hearing or vote, 310 days before the President left office.215
The Senate leadership made clear that it was holding the vacancy open
for then-candidate Donald Trump to fill should he win the election,
while one Senate Republican leader added that he would block all

appeal); Dalibor Rohac, Liz Kennedy & Vikram Singh, Drivers of
Authoritarian Populism in the United States, Ctr. for Am. Progress
(May 10, 2018), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/
reports/2018/05/10/450552/drivers-authoritarian-populism-united-states/
[https://perma.cc/42UT-JH66] (linking polarization to success of Trump’s
populist appeal).
212. See Scheppele, supra note 202, at 553; see also Michael Hoffman, [PiS]sing
off the Courts: The PiS Party’s Effect on Judicial Independence in Poland,
51 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 1153, 1161–64 (2018) (discussing tactics to
weaken judicial independence as feature of Populist regime in Poland).
213. Perry Bacon Jr., Trump Completed His Takeover of the GOP in 2019,
FiveThirtyEight (Dec. 23, 2019, 5:50 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/
features/trump-completed-his-takeover-of-the-gop-in-2019/ [https://perma
.cc/HV7Y-XCWZ].
214. See Elaine Godfrey, The Democrats’ Supreme Court Hail Mary, Atlantic
(Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/09/
democrats-case-court-packing/616446/ [https://perma.cc/R88Z-D7HA].
215. Eric Bradner, Here’s What Happened When Senate Republicans Refused to
Vote on Merrick Garland’s Supreme Court Nomination, CNN (Sept. 19,
2020, 8:16 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/18/politics/merrick-garlan
d-senate-republicans-timeline/index.html [https://perma.cc/2F8C-H5TL].
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Supreme Court nominations for the next four years if Democratic
Presidential nominee Hillary Clinton was elected.216
In characterizing the Garland gambit as extraordinary, I do not
mean to suggest that there is no precedent for the Senate declining to
act on pending Supreme Court nominations, thereby leaving the vacan–
cy for the President’s successor to fill. In 1829, the Senate voted to
postpone action on President John Quincy Adams’ nomination of John
Crittendon to the Supreme Court, whom Adams had nominated in the
final weeks of his term after he had lost his bid for reelection.217 In 1845,
the wildly unpopular President John Tyler, who became President after
the death of William Henry Harrison, nominated John Read to the
Supreme Court 25 days before Tyler left office—a nomination that the
Senate allowed to lapse. 218 In 1852 and 1853, three Supreme Court
nominees (Edward Bradford, George Badger, and William Micou) of
the likewise unpopular President Millard Fillmore, who succeeded
Zachary Taylor upon his death, were withdrawn or allowed to lapse
200, 60, and 18 days, respectively, before the end of Fillmore’s term.219
And in 1866, after Democratic President Andrew Johnson became
President following the assassination of Abraham Lincoln, the
Republican Congress reduced the size of the Supreme Court from ten
to seven, killing the pending Supreme Court nomination of Henry

216. Nina Totenberg, Sen. McCain Says Republicans Will Block All Court
Nominations If Clinton Wins, NPR (Oct. 17, 2016, 9:44 PM)
https://www.npr.org/2016/10/17/498328520/sen-mccain-says-republican
s-will-block-all-court-nominations-if-clinton-wins [https://perma.cc/2KV
3-KCQ7] (“‘I promise you that we will be united against any Supreme
Court nominee that Hillary Clinton, if she were president, would put up,’
[Senator McCain] declared.”).
217. Mark Lawrence, Supreme Court Nominees Rejected by the Senate, Wash.
Post (Sept. 15, 1987), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/
politics/1987/09/15/supreme-court-nominees-rejected-by-the-senate/28a
be505-180f-423d-a774-adfb861ef2e0/ [https://perma.cc/X8HE-ETB3].
218. Supreme Court Nominations (1789–Present), U.S. Senate, https://www.
senate.gov/legislative/nominations/SupremeCourtNominations1789present
.htm#17 [https://perma.cc/CLP7-26EJ] (last visited Feb. 14, 2021). In
addition, Tyler nominees Reuben Walworth, John Spencer, and Edward
King were variously rejected, postponed, withdrawn, or allowed to lapse,
but their travails preceded Senate confirmation of Tyler nominee Samuel
Nelson and so they cannot serve as examples of nominations killed for the
purpose of holding a vacancy open for the next President. Id.; see also John
Tyler, History.com, https://www.history.com/topics/us-presidents/johntyler [https://perma.cc/2XZC-MCBB] (last updated Jul. 9, 2020).
219. Id.; see also Millard Fillmore, History.com, https://www.history.com/
topics/us-presidents/millard-fillmore [https://perma.cc/LY2S-AP9W] (last
updated Aug. 21, 2018).
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Stanbery 1,063 days before the end of Johnson’s term. 220 After
Republican Ulysses Grant became President, Congress increased the
Supreme Court’s size from seven to nine, effectively handing Grant
vacancies denied Johnson.221
These “precedents,” however, are distinguishable in three ways:
first, they are stale, the latest example having occurred one hundred
and fifty years before action on the Garland nomination was suspended.
Resurrecting a practice poised to celebrate the sesquicentennial of its
disuse may better be characterized as a repudiation of a convention
against the practice. Second, all four “precedent” Presidents suffered
electoral legitimacy problems: three were never elected President, and
the fourth—John Quincy Adams—had been defeated in his bid for
reelection when he made the nomination. Third, President Obama’s
nomination of Garland occurred months earlier in the President’s term
than the failed nominations of Adams, Tyler or Fillmore. Not so with
Johnson, but legislation that reduced the size of the Court and ended
Stanbery’s nomination won bipartisan approval in Congress and was
signed by the President himself, which belies the implication that it was
a partisan power play to deprive Johnson of his appointment.222 And
when the Supreme Court was increased from seven to nine during the
Grant administration, it was for the administrative purpose of restoring
the traditional parity between the number of circuits and the number
of justices on the Supreme Court.223 If this was subterfuge, it was wellhidden, relative to the brazen power play of the Garland episode.
Indeed, the Senate’s apolitical pretense of tabling the Garland
nomination so that the electorate could decide which president should
appoint the next justice, was abandoned four years later, when the
Senate Republican leadership forged ahead with the confirmation of
Trump nominee Amy Coney Barrett after Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
died just six weeks before the 2020 presidential election.224
Beyond the Garland imbroglio, when President Trump took office,
the Senate Republican majority exercised the so-called “nuclear option”
to deprive Senate Democrats of the power to filibuster Supreme Court

220. Id.; Stanley I. Kutler, Reconstruction and the Supreme Court: The
Numbers Game Reconsidered, 32 J. S. Hist. 42, 42, 52 (1966).
221. U.S. Senate, supra note 218; Kutler, supra note 220, at 42, 52.
222. See supra notes 85–90 and accompanying text.
223. Judiciary Act of 1869, ch. 22, 16 Stat. 44.
224. Susan Davis, ‘Shameless’: Senators Still Sparring Over Timing of Supreme
Court Nomination, Nat’l Pub. Radio (Oct. 12, 2020), https://www.npr.
org/sections/live-amy-coney-barrett-supreme-court-confirmation/2020/10/
12/922980926/shameless-senators-still-sparring-over-timing-of-supreme-cou
rt-nomination [https://perma.cc/58Y3-BBGR].
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nominees,225 six years after a Senate Democratic majority had done the
same to Senate Republicans in lower court confirmation proceedings.226
During Judicial Independence 3.0, senators from both parties had
exploited their filibuster rights to kill nominations of the opposing
party’s President227—an arguable abuse of the procedural convention
that the nuclear option ended. At the same time, the Senate rule change
eliminated a mechanism that ensured a measure of bipartisan consensus
and compromise before nominees could win confirmation, thereby
creating a vacuum to be filled by bare-knuckle, majoritarian, partisan
politics.
In a similar vein, the Senate Republican majority ended the blueslip prerogative.228 In so doing, Senate Democrats were stripped of the
power to obstruct the confirmation of President Trump’s nominees by
withholding a blue-slip authorizing floor action on the nominees from
the Senator’s home state. But it also eliminated the opportunity for
consultation and consensus that the blue-slip process had historically
promoted.229
Finally, President Trump eliminated the American Bar
Association’s pre-nomination role in vetting judicial candidates. 230
President George W. Bush had done the same during Judicial
Independence 3.0, but there were two new twists. First, the role of
traditional qualifications, upon which ABA ratings are based, was
diminished in relevance during the Trump administration, as reflected
in an unprecedented number of Trump nominees being confirmed with
ABA “not qualified” ratings—including the first two ever at the circuit
level. 231 Second, to assist it in pre-vetting judicial candidates, the
225. Glenn Thrush, Senate Republicans Go “Nuclear” to Speed Up Trump
Confirmations, N.Y. Times (Apr. 3, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/04/03/us/politics/senate-republicans-nuclear-option.html [https://per
ma.cc/DH46-65SA].
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Sarah Binder, The Senate Confirmed Eric Miller to the 9th Circuit Court
of Appeals—Despite His Home State Senators’ Objections. That’s New.,
Wash. Post (Feb. 28, 2019, 3:43 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/politics/2019/02/28/senate-confirmed-eric-miller-ninth-circuit-courtappeals-despite-feinsteins-objection-thats-new/ [https://perma.cc/ZC78-R
Q3L].
229. When Courts & Congress Collide, supra note 34, at 211.
230. Adam Liptak, White House Ends Bar Association’s Role in Vetting Judges,
N.Y. Times (Mar. 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/31/
us/politics/white-house-american-bar-association-judges.html [https://per
ma.cc/62S8-TCT4].
231. Patrick L. Gregory, Trumps Picks More “Not Qualified” Judges,
Bloomberg Law (Dec. 19, 2018, 10:11 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.
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Trump Administration replaced the ABA (which, despite accusations
of liberal bias, professed ideological neutrality and was expressly
nonpartisan) with the Federalist Society, an organization with a
conservative, ideological agenda.232
With conventions designed to promote consensus, compromise,
reasoned deliberation, and a focus on traditional qualifications thus
repudiated, confirmation proceedings have become strangely perfunc–
tory affairs in Judicial Independence 4.0. Nominees have been scheduled
for hearings en masse, sometimes during legislative recesses, and have
been confirmed along partisan lines with unprecedented speed for the
modern era. 233 The fractious delays and protracted squabbling that
characterized the appointments process during Judicial Independence
3.0, have been replaced with an efficient, partisan assembly-line
featuring minimal independent Senate scrutiny.
2. Assault on Court-Packing Conventions

In 2017, Federalist Society Chairman, Steven G. Calabresi,
coauthored a memo to both houses of Congress proposing that Congress
double the size of the federal appellate judiciary for the explicitly
partisan purpose of packing the circuit courts with conservative judges
to neutralize the impact of Obama-era appointments.234 The proposal

com/us-law-week/trump-picks-more-not-qualified-judges-1 [https://perma.
cc/9YMA-8JWX].
232. David Montgomery, Conquerors of the Courts, Wash. Post (Jan. 2,
2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/magazine/wp/2019/01/0
2/feature/conquerors-of-the-courts/ [https://perma.cc/JLY7-VEPL].
233. Tessa Berenson, President Trump Appointed Four Times as Many
Federal Appeals Judges as Obama in His First Year, TIME (Dec. 15,
2017, 2:09 PM), https://time.com/5066679/donald-trump-federal-judgesrecord/ [https://perma.cc/7D57-GWMH]; Ariane de Vogue, Senate
Committee Backs 44 Trump Judicial Nominees Over Democratic
Objections, CNN (Feb. 7, 2019, 4:49 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/
02/07/politics/senate-judicial-nominations/index.html [https://perma.cc
/2MQG-WEHV]; Nina Totenberg, Republicans Holding Judicial Hearing
With Senate in Recess, NPR (Oct. 28, 2018, 7:11 AM), https://www.npr.
org/2018/10/25/660463475/republicans-holding-judicial-hearing-with-sen
ate-in-recess [https://perma.cc/TU2K-BDJJ].
234. Proposed Judgeship Bill from Professor Steven G. Calabresi & Sham Hirji,
Nw. Univ. Pritzker Sch. of L., to U.S. Congress (Nov. 7, 2017), available
at https://archive.thinkprogress.org/uploads/2017/11/calabresi-court-pa
cking-memo.pdf. In his memo to Congress, Calabresi did not identify
himself as Federalist Society Chairman nor did he offer the customary
disclaimer that he was writing in his individual capacity, which had the
presumably intended effect of adding heft to a proposal that was widely
reported with explicit reference to his leadership of the Federalist Society.
See Josh Blackman, Republicans Should Not Pack the Courts, Nat’l Rev.
(Nov. 27, 2017, 7:05 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/11/
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was remarkable in at least two respects. First, this was the
recommendation of a highly influential player in the world of judicial
politics: Calabresi was the face of the Federalist Society, which was not
only the preeminent organization of conservative legal minds in the
United States—it was, as previously noted, in the President’s inner
circle, having assumed responsibility for vetting the administration’s
prospective judicial nominees.235 Second, for the leader of a conservative
organization ostensibly devoted to interpreting the U.S. Constitution in
a manner constrained by the original intentions of the founders, the
proposal represents a seeming break from the Society’s principles. From
an originalist perspective, exploiting Congressional power to establish
the lower courts by packing those courts with ideological soulmates for
the partisan purpose of manipulating the outcomes of the cases the
courts decide, is in obvious tension with the apolitical, separate and
independent judiciary that the framers sought to create.236
The need for the Calabresi proposal was largely mooted by Senate
rule changes that eliminated procedural impediments to Senate
Republicans ending the sizable backlog of vacancies created by their
dilatory tactics in declining to act on President Obama’s nominations.237
Meanwhile, congressional Democrats and Democratic presidential
candidates, not to be outdone in the convention-busting derby,
proposed to neutralize the impact of the Garland ploy by packing the
U.S. Supreme Court with additional justices, when the Democrats

republicans-court-nominations-congress-shouldnt-pack-courts/
perma.cc/ATF3-8GDL].

[https://

235. See supra note 232 and accompanying text. See also, Linda Greenhouse,
A Conservative Plan to Weaponize the Federal Courts, N.Y. Times (Nov.
23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/23/opinion/conservativesweaponize-federal-courts.html [https://perma.cc/FKF3-36AP].
236. Senator William Giles, for example, a Jeffersonian Republican who led
the only successful effort in American history to unpack the federal courts
for explicitly partisan purposes, was admirably candid in acknowledging
that his congressional campaign to disestablish unpopular federal courts
(and effectively remove their office-holders) exploited gaps in the text of
the Constitution in a manner that ran counter to the founders’ intentions
to establish a separate and independent judicial branch: “The theory of
three distinct departments in government is, perhaps, not critically
correct . . . although it is obvious that the framers of our constitution
proceeded on this theory in its formation . . . .” 17 Annals of Cong. 114
(1808) (statement of William Giles).
237. Such dilatory tactics were exploited by both political parties throughout
the Clinton, G.W. Bush, and Obama Administrations. Russell Wheeler,
Judicial Nominations and Confirmations: Fact and Fiction, Brookings
(Dec. 30, 2013), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2013/12/30/
judicial-nominations-and-confirmations-fact-and-fiction/ [https://perma.
cc/KQL3-JENX].
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returned to power, and in the aftermath of the 2020 election have
introduced legislation to do just that.238
3.

Repudiation of Convention Against Delegitimizing Rhetoric

As described in relation to the emergence of constitutional
conventions during Judicial Independence 2.0, Presidents have criti–
cized judicial rulings throughout American history and made it clear
when they thought that a case was wrongly decided.239 With the notable
exception of Franklin Roosevelt, however, there has been a longstanding
norm against Presidents resorting to delegitimizing rhetoric that
impugns the motives, integrity, or competence of the judges themselves.
Beginning as a Presidential candidate, however, and carrying over into
his presidency, President Trump defied this convention and repeatedly
challenged the legitimacy of court rulings adverse to his interests.
While a Presidential candidate, Trump criticized the presiding
judge in a fraud case filed against Trump University. At a campaign
rally, he described the judge as “a hater of Donald Trump,” and a “total
disgrace,” and claimed that because of his “Mexican heritage,” the
judge was compromised by an “inherent conflict of interest,” given Mr.
Trump’s campaign promise to build a wall to deter illegal immigration
along the Mexican border.240
As President, he criticized lower court rulings invalidating an
executive order that restricted travel into the U.S. by citizens of
predominantly Muslim countries. He described one ruling as the work
of a “so-called judge, which essentially takes law-enforcement away
from our country.”241 He characterized related rulings by other courts
as “done by a judge for political reasons,” and as issued by courts that

238. Burgess Everett & Marianne Levine, 2020 Dems warm to expanding
Supreme Court, Politico (Mar. 18, 2019, 5:04 AM), https://www.politico.
com/story/2019/03/18/2020-democrats-supreme-court-1223625 [https://
perma.cc/D3RY-JZUU]; Press Releases, Expand the Supreme Court to
Restore Justice and Democracy to Judicial System, April 15, 2021,
https://judiciary.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=450
8#:~:text=Washington%2C%20April%2015%2C%202021&text=introduce
d%20the%20Judiciary%20Act%20of,a%2013%2Djustice%20Supreme%20C
ourt.
239. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
240. Daniel White, Donald Trump Ramps Up Attacks Against Judge in Trump
University Case, Time (June 2, 2016, 8:50 PM), https://time.com/43
56045/donald-trump-judge-gonzalo-curiel/ [https://perma.cc/CBC2-XY
JM].
241. Steven G. Calabresi, Trump Can Criticize Judges All He Likes. Lincoln
Did., The Hill (Feb. 8, 2017, 4:20 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/pun
dits-blog/the-judiciary/318547-trump-can-criticize-so-called-judges-all-he
-likes-lincoln [https://perma.cc/7F4V-P599].
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are “slow and political,”242 that “seem to be so political,” and that refuse
to “do what they should be doing.”243 In response to the same line of
cases, he expressed dismay that “a judge would put our country in such
peril . . . . If something happens blame him and court system;”244 and
again, that “[b]ecause the ban was lifted by a judge, many very bad
and dangerous people may be pouring into our country. A terrible
decision.”245
The President’s attacks on the federal courts reached a crescendo
in November 2018, when he condemned the adverse ruling of a district
judge in the Northern District of California as the work of an “Obama
judge.”246 In a highly unusual move, Chief Justice John Roberts
rebuked the President. “We do not have Obama judges or Trump
judges, Bush judges or Clinton judges,” Roberts said in a prepared
statement. 247 “What we have is an extraordinary group of
dedicated judges doing their level best to do equal right to those
appearing before them,” adding that “[t]he independent judiciary
is something we should all be thankful for.” 248 The President
promptly rejoined with multiple Tweets: “Sorry Chief Justice John
Roberts,” the President chided, “but you do indeed have ‘Obama
242. Garrett Epps, With the Travel Ban, Federal Courts Face a New Legal Issue,
USA Today (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2017/03/with-the-travel-ban-federal-courts-face-a-new-legal-issue/
520200/ [https://perma.cc/P3C2-4NZT]; David Jackson, Trump Seeks
Quick Supreme Court Review of “Travel Ban”, USA Today (June 5, 2017,
7:17 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/06/05/
donald-trump-travel-ban-supreme-court/102509292/ [https://perma.cc/A5
ZX-BP7A].
243. Jacob Pramuk, Trump Defiant on Travel Ban, Blasts the Courts as “So
Political”, CNBC (Feb. 8, 2017, 10:55 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/
2017/02/08/trump-defends-his-immigration-order-to-police-claims-courts
-seem-to-be-so-political.html [https://perma.cc/KT77-394V].
244. Peter Baker, Trump Clashes Early with Courts, Portending Years of Legal
Battles, N.Y. Times (Feb. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/0
5/us/politics/donald-trump-mike-pence-travel-ban-judge.html [https://per
ma.cc/KT77-394V].
245. Matt Zapotosky, Trump Said Dangerous People Might be Pouring in
Without His Travel Ban. But He’s Not Rushing to Restore It., Wash. Post
(Mar. 23, 2017, 4:43 PM), https://washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/
wp/2017/03/23/trump-said-dangerous-people-might-be-pouring-in-without
-his-travel-ban-but-hes-not-rushing-to-restore-it [https://perma.cc/2H5J-B
JCV].
246. Katie Reilly, President Trump Escalates Attacks on “Obama Judges” After
Rare Rebuke from Chief Justice, TIME (Nov. 21, 2018, 5:19 PM),
https://time.com/5461827/donald-trump-judiciary-chief-justice-john-rober
ts/ [https://perma.cc/627F-LA34].
247. Id.
248. Id.
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judges,’ and they have a much different point of view than the people
who are charged with the safety of our country.”249 “It would be great
if the 9th Circuit was indeed an ‘independent judiciary,’” he added, but
argued that it was not, given the frequency with which administration
antagonists filed suit there and the rate at which Ninth Circuit decisions
were reversed. 250 The next day, the President tweeted again, that
“Justice Roberts can say what he wants, but the 9th Circuit is a
complete & total disaster. It is out of control, has a horrible reputation,
is overturned more than any Circuit in the Country.”251
Some commentators responded to this kerfuffle by dismissing the
Chief Justice as naïve for claiming that “[w]e have no Obama judges or
Trump judges,” because Presidents nominate judges with compatible
ideological outlooks that influence the decisions those judges make
which, in turn, influences voter choices in presidential elections.252 But
this argument misses the Chief Justice’s essential point. Yes, the vast
majority of the public thinks that judges are subject to the influence of
their political ideologies—an unexceptional manifestation of legal
realism that social science data corroborate, the public finds
untroubling, and that the Chief Justice’s statement did not contest.253
But the data also show that public confidence in the courts declines

249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. A news report on the President’s tweets noted that two other circuits—
the Sixth and the Eleventh—have higher reversal rates than the Ninth. Id.
252. See, e.g., Marc A. Thiessen, Opinion: Chief Justice Roberts is Wrong. We
Do Have Obama Judges and Trump Judges, Wash. Post (Nov. 23, 2018,
3:05 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/chief-justice-rober
ts-is-wrong-we-do-have-obama-judges-and-trump-judges/2018/11/23/ee8
de9a2-ef2c-11e8-8679-934a2b33be52_story.html [https://perma.cc/JQ8ZRQD2].
253. See James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Has Legal Realism Damaged
the Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court?, 45 L. & Soc’y Rev. 195, 214
(2011). The Chief Justice’s own confirmation testimony, wherein he asserted
that judges were like “umpires” who applied but did not make the rules,
was a piece of political theater that hewed to a naïve formulation of the rule
of law mantra that social science data has challenged, if not debunked.
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be
Chief Justice of the United States, Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55–56 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.).
The Chief’s statement here, in contrast, contended only that judges do not
self-identify as appendages of their appointing Presidents and do their “level
best” to treat the parties equally—unexceptional claims relating to judges’
motivations that attitudinal studies of judicial decision-making do not
address or contradict. Id.
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when judges are perceived as brazen, partisan actors. 254 It is the
difference between honorable judges whose policy perspectives inform
their understanding of what the law is, and dishonorable judges who
surreptitiously implement the partisan agenda of the President who
appointed them. In other words, characterizing judges as partisan
agents of their appointing President threatens to delegitimize the
courts, in ways that conceding the influence of political ideology on
judicial decision-making does not. Empirical support for characterizing
federal judges and their decision-making in such crassly partisan terms
is thin—and it was the partisan focus of the President’s critique that
triggered the Chief Justice’s response.
4. Testing the Convention Against Defiance of Court Rulings

One possible end-game strategy in a neo-populist President’s
campaign to delegitimize the courts is to weaken public trust in the
judiciary to a point where defying unwelcome court orders becomes
thinkable. 255 The convention against Presidents openly refusing to
comply with court orders is relatively muscular, with only one flagrant
violation in American history—a violation that can be explained in light
of the exigencies of a wartime emergency that President Lincoln
confronted.256 To date, Judicial Independence 4.0 has produced no new
examples—but there has been one close call, in a political culture with
a history of few close calls.
The Trump administration proposed to modify the 2020 census by
adding a question asking respondents whether they were U.S. citizens.257
254. See James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Citizens, Courts, and
Confirmations: Positivity Theory and Judgments of the Amer–
ican People 123, 125 (2009).
255. A second end-game strategy—less germane to this sub-section on defiance
of court orders but nonetheless relevant to the future of judicial inde–
pendence generally—is that a campaign of delegitimizing rhetoric could
intimidate judges into acquiescence to the President’s will.
256. See David H. Gans, The President’s Duty to Obey Court Judgments,
Const. Accountability Ctr. 11 (June 2018), https://www.theus
constitution.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Trump-Obey-Court-Judgm
ents-Issue-Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/C84G-P9VD] (explaining how
Lincoln did not seek to defy the Court in Ex Parte Merryman, but only to
exercise a wartime exception); see also Abraham Lincoln, Message to
Congress in Special Session, July 4, 1861, in 4 Collected Works of
Abraham Lincoln 421, 430 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) (emphasizing
Lincoln’s argument for an exception in the case of a wartime emergency);
see generally Ex Parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 147–48 (C.C.D. Md.
1861) (No. 9,487) (holding that the President lacks the constitutional
authority to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and cannot
authorize a military officer to do so).
257. Thomas P. Wolf & Brianna Cea, A Critical History of the United States
Census and Citizenship Questions, 108 Geo. L.J. Online 1, 3 (2019).
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Critics of the proposal filed multiple suits, claiming that the question
would discourage immigrants (who lived disproportionately in states
with Democratic majorities) from participating in the census, which
would result in undercounting residents in those states, thereby
frustrating the purpose of the census for the benefit of Republicans
when legislative districts were redrawn in light of population changes.258
The administration argued that the question was needed to assist it in
enforcing the Voting Rights Act. A closely divided Supreme Court,
however, rejected that justification as a pretext, but allowed for the
possibility that some other explanation might pass muster.259
The President called the ruling “ridiculous,” and indicated his
intention to explore ways in which he might restore the question to the
census via executive order. 260 The President’s response caused
speculation that he was poised to defy the Supreme Court’s order.261
There was room to argue that he was simply exploring alternative,
legally defensible reasons for adding the citizenship question,262 but that
argument was undercut by reports of multiple, contradictory rationales
being floated for including the question against the backdrop of docu–
ments discovered showing that Republican strategists had originally
proposed to add the question for the illicit purpose of discouraging
immigrants from participating in the census.263 Suspicions of impending
258. Andrew Prokop, Trump’s Census Citizenship Question Fiasco, Explained,
Vox (July 11, 2019, 6:05 PM), https://www.vox.com/2019/7/11/206
89015/census-citizenship-question-trump-executive-order [https://perma.
cc/7WNM-EK9V].
259. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2575–76 (2019).
260. Jacqueline Thomsen, Supreme Court Rules Against Trump on Census
Citizenship Question, The Hill (June 27, 2019, 10:44 AM), https://thehill.
com/regulation/court-battles/450641-supreme-court-rules-against-trump-a
dministration-over-census [https://perma.cc/3D4D-WDJZ]; see also Tara
Bahrampour, Matt Zapotosky & Josh Dawsey, Reversing Course, Trump
Administration Will Look For a Way to Add Citizenship Question to 2020
Census, Wash. Post (July 4, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/trump-appears-to-contradict-his-own-administration-on-census-citi
zenship-question/2019/07/03/b720bb94-9da4-11e9-b27f-ed2942f73d70_sto
ry.html [https://perma.cc/99AY-8YJ].
261. See, e.g., Jacqueline Thomsen, DOJ Reverses, Says it’s Trying to Find
Ways to Include Citizenship Question on 2020 Census, The Hill (July 3,
2019, 5:36 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/451639-doj
-ordered-to-find-ways-to-include-citizenship-question-on-2020 [https://per
ma.cc/9DXG-T6DN]; Michael Wines & Adam Liptak, Trump Considering
an Executive Order to Allow Citizenship Question on Census, N.Y. Times
(July 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/05/us/census-question.
html [https://perma.cc/R5AV-KBZM].
262. Thomsen, supra note 260.
263. JM Rieger, The Trump Administration Changed its Story on the Census
Citizenship Question 12 Times in Four Months, Wash. Post (July 11,
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defiance were heightened when the Department of Justice lawyers
responsible for representing the administration in the matter sought to
withdraw from the case, which implied the possibility that their client
was poised to take action that the lawyers could not defend without
running afoul of their ethical responsibilities. 264 One presiding judge
denied the request of counsel to withdraw,265 another declined to permit
them to do so without a written explanation,266 and the administration
ultimately relented.267
Professors Josh Chafetz and David Pozen argue that when a
convention withstands challenge, in situations such as this, it emerges
stronger and more entrenched.268 To that extent, this episode arguably
strengthened rather than jeopardized the convention against presi–
dential defiance of court orders. With history as a guide, I agree that
conventions which survive periodic stress tests emerge renewed, and
that if the nation moves on from its current neo-populist romance with
the census case as the only test of the convention against defiance, the
same will hold true here. But for a President who repeatedly revisited
and revised his public positions and policy pronouncements, calling this
episode a win for the convention rather than a worry for the future is
akin to the people of ancient Pompeii celebrating the end of Vesuvius’s
first rumble.
In sum, during Judicial Independence 4.0, democracy fatigue,
paired with a swell of anti-elitism, has engendered a political
2019, 8:49 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/07/08/
trump-administration-has-changed-its-story-census-citizenship-question-lea
st-times-four-months/?utm_term=.7511fb567c5d [https://perma.cc/4XX8
-ZMUJ]. See also Prokop, supra note 258.
264. Renato Mariotti, Trump’s Path Forward on Census Question Could be
Headed to Constitutional Crisis, Politico (July 10, 2019), https://www.
politico.com/magazine/story/2019/07/10/trump-census-citizenship-quest
ion-supreme-court-department-justice-227280 [https://perma.cc/C49K-K
6FE].
265. Emma Newburger, Judge Rejects Trump Administration’s Request to
Swap Lawyers in Census Case, CNBC (July 9, 2019, 6:54 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/09/census-judge-rejects-trump-administ
rations-request-to-swap-lawyers.html [https://perma.cc/QP8P-ZRV4].
266. Mariotti, supra note 264.
267. See Hansi Lo Wang & Franco Ordoñez, Trump Backs Off Census
Citizenship Question Fight, NPR (July 11, 2019, 12:42 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2019/07/11/739858115/trump-expected-to-renew-pu
sh-for-census-citizenship-question-with-executive-acti [https://perma.cc/JZ
S5-BVQY]; see also President Trump Remarks on Census Citizenship
Question, C-SPAN (July 11, 2019), https://www.c-span.org/video/?4625
35-1/trump-administration-longer-pursue-citizenship-question-2020-census
&live= [https://perma.cc/D7NZ-P47S].
268. Josh Chafetz & David E. Pozen, How Constitutional Norms Break Down,
65 UCLA L. Rev. 1430, 1449 (2018).
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atmosphere leading the United States to join a world-wide movement
toward a more polarized, autocratic, and populist leadership that has
little patience for an independent judiciary impeding its agenda. These
developments, which followed generations of heightening skepticism
over the putative role of an independent judiciary in the ROLP, have
culminated in the disruption, and sometimes the repudiation, of
longstanding judicial-independence conventions, and placed the future
of customary independence in jeopardy.

IV. Envisioning Judicial Independence 5.0
Judicial Independence 3.0 eroded support for the traditional role of
an independent judiciary in the ROLP, and in so doing rendered the
conventions that had long protected judicial independence more
vulnerable to cyclical attack. Judicial Independence 4.0 corresponds to
the arrival of the latest cycle, which arose following the transition of
power from the Obama to the Trump administrations. I have
denominated Judicial Independence 4.0 as such because it poses a new
and more potent threat to an independent judiciary, having disrupted
or repudiated long-respected constitutional conventions that withstood
challenge in prior cycles of court-directed anger. With the future of an
independent judiciary in doubt, the compound question becomes
whether judicial independence is worth saving, and if so, how?
Insofar as the collapse of independence conventions in stage 4.0 was
facilitated by protracted erosion of support for the role of judicial
independence in the ROLP during 3.0, the search for solutions must
begin with the ailing ROLP. Without a defensible paradigm to
galvanize support for an independent judiciary, the political will to
restore independence conventions lacks raison d’être. In the meantime,
however, independence conventions have been set aside, and a period
of bare-knuckle, partisan judicial politics is upon us. Long-term
strategies for the restoration of independence conventions guided by a
more sustainable paradigm must therefore be coupled with short-term
strategies for transitioning from the relative chaos of convention-free
politics that Judicial Independence 4.0 has wrought.
A. A New Legal Culture Paradigm269

During Judicial Independence 3.0, a series of developments
converged to challenge, if not debunk, a premise at the core of the
ROLP: that independent judges impartially uphold the law, impervious
to extralegal influences. One possible response to this generations-long
turn of events is to allow the crumbling edifice of judicial independence
to collapse under its own weight and accept the inevitability of a
judiciary that is more responsive to partisan and majoritarian pressures.
269. For an initial stab at the Legal Culture Paradigm that I propose here, see
generally Geyh, supra note 44, at 76–100.
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Such a response makes sense if judicial independence is to blame for its
own undoing—if its foundation is too antiquated to be salvageable. If,
however, as I argue here, the problem lies not with judicial
independence itself, but with how judicial independence has been
conceptualized in the context of the ROLP, then the solution is not to
jettison judicial independence but to rework the paradigm itself.
I begin from an unexceptional premise that is compatible with the
ROLP: in the Unites States’ version of a representative democracy that
is committed to the rule of law, the judiciary’s role is to uphold
applicable law on a case-by-case basis. Accepting that premise, there
are two potentially deleterious sources of interference with judicial
decision-making. One is external: the role of the judiciary is undermined
if outsiders influence judges to disregard the law via resort to carrots
or sticks. The other is internal: the role of the judiciary is undermined
if judges disregard the law by indulging their own ideological or other
biases. The paradox embedded in the ROLP is that judicial
independence, in the form of structural safeguards against outside
interference with judicial decision-making, protects against distortions
of law from external sources, at the same time as it exacerbates the
potential for distortions of law from internal sources by eliminating
controls on judicial decision-making that could deter bias.
This paradox results from an unduly parsimonious conception of
judicial independence. The ROLP focuses on structural mechanisms,
such as tenure and salary protections, aided by constitutional conven–
tions, which buffer judges from external sources of interference with
impartial judicial decision-making (“structural independence”), while
paying insufficient heed to judicial independence from internal sources
of interference with judicial behavior (“behavioral independence”).270 In
a theoretical vacuum, structural independence enables behavioral
dependence, insofar as freedom from external controls on judicial
decision-making liberates judges to satiate their internal biases without
fear of consequence. The long, slow erosion of support for the ROLP
during Judicial Independence 3.0 is in large part attributable to the
paradigm’s failure to come to terms with the need for behavioral
independence, and the extent to which the muscular, structural
independence that the paradigm embraces can beget a form of
behavioral dependence that social science has documented.
Proponents of the ROLP have addressed the behavioral-dependence
problem by positing it out of existence: independent judges disregard
their extralegal predilections and uphold the law—full stop. Apart from
flying in the face of empirical research and public opinion, this
proposition is hopelessly counterintuitive: in what parallel universe does
a decision-maker’s independence from external control incentivize that
decision-maker to disregard her own biases when making decisions? The
270. Charles Gardner Geyh, Judicial Independence as an Organizing Principle,
10 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 185, 190–91 (2014).
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ROLPers have countered social science, public opinion, and common
sense with a hapless bromide, and it should surprise no one that they
are losing the argument.
To the extent that judges do exhibit behavioral independence and
uphold the law regardless of their own policy preferences, it is not due
to structural independence from external sources of control over their
decision-making by itself. It is because judges are predisposed to bracket
out their extralegal predilections and follow the law for other reasons—
reasons that structural independence protects from encroachment.
Those “other reasons” are supplied by the legal culture in which judges
are entrenched.
In proposing a Legal Culture Paradigm, I borrow from anth–
ropology to define “culture” as a “set of shared, signifying practices—
practices by which meaning is produced, performed, contested, or
transformed.”271 Next, in thinking about a distinct legal culture, I steer
clear of innumerable “signifying practices” that are debatable or
ephemeral and bear down on three essential, enduring, and less
contestable practices that constitute tenets of the Legal Culture
Paradigm.
First, judges are acculturated to take law seriously. This
commitment to law begins in law school and continues in practice,
where sound legal analysis and argumentation, (putatively) uncorr–
upted by feelings and personal beliefs, are the coin of the realm. The
primacy of law in resolving legal problems is reflected in the law school
curriculum, which is top-heavy with courses on substantive and
procedural law; Socratic dialogues, where students are guided by their
faculty to sort wheat from chaff and divine the law upon which cases
and problems turn; law school exams, which test the student’s
command of law in its application to hypothetical fact patterns; the bar
exam, which is a veritable trivia test on substantive and procedural
law; and litigation practice, where motions practice and brief writing
proceed from the premise that applicable facts in relation to operative
law are of paramount importance. Social science corroborates the
intuition that the legal culture’s fixation on substantive and procedural
law affects how law students and lawyers (who later become judges)
think about and resolve legal problems.272
271. Naomi Mezey, Law as Culture, in Cultural Studies, Cultural
Analysis, and the Law: Moving Beyond Legal Realism 37, 42
(Austen D. Sarat & Jonathan Simon eds., 2003).
272. Lief H. Carter & Thomas F. Burke, Reason in Law 8 (6th ed. 2002);
Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself: A Review of Empirical Research on
Attorney Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 Am. U. L. Rev. 1337,
1409–10 (1997); James R. P. Ogloff, David R. Lyon, Kevin S. Douglas &
V. Gordon Rose, More than “Learning to Think Like a Lawyer:” The
Empirical Research on Legal Education, 34 Creighton L. Rev. 73, 111
(2000); Eileen Braman, Law, Politics, and Perception: How Policy
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Second, likewise beginning in law school and continuing in practice,
future judges are exposed to pervasive legal indeterminacy. Indeter–
minacy is inherent in difficult cases, where a legal issue is one of first
impression; where a statute’s meaning in its application to the facts of
the case is ambiguous; where judicial precedents conflict or are unclear;
or where operative law affords judges the discretion to reach different
conclusions. “Learning to think like a lawyer,” which law schools tout
as their mission, is an exercise in critical thinking. Law students are
disabused of their natural inclination to accept judicial opinions at face
value, and are trained to challenge the assumptions, logic, and
conclusions of those opinions. That exercise enables fledgling lawyers to
exploit indeterminacy by seeing and arguing “both sides” of difficult
legal questions (divorced from their own policy preferences), to the end
of making themselves more effective advocates for their clients in an
adversarial system of justice.
Third, future judges—again beginning as law students—seek to
resolve indeterminate legal questions with reference to competing policy
arguments that aid them in deciding which of two comparably plausible
interpretations of law is best. Different maxims of interpretation can
lead to different results;273 the interests of fairness and justice may be
in tension with the interests of predictability and efficiency; interpreting
law with recourse to its plain meaning, original intent, primary purpose,
or a need to avoid absurd results may yield different outcomes; and the
dictates of prudence can lead judges to think strategically and resolve
some indeterminate questions but not others. When judges are called
upon to decide indeterminate legal questions with reference to
competing policy arguments, the argument they find most persuasive
can be informed by their background, education, life experience,
common sense, and policy perspective, aided by a strategic sense for
the political context in which the case arose.
These three practices core to the legal culture corroborate and
qualify components of the ROLP. Behavioral independence—
manifested as a predisposition to resolve legal questions with reference
to operative law, divorced from personal attitudes—is a practice
inculcated into judges as an essential part of the legal culture in which
they are immersed. Structural independence promotes behavioral
independence and the rule of law by buffering judges from external
pressure to disregard what the first signifying practice of their legal
culture predisposes them to do: take law seriously. Such a claim is
simplest to defend in the context of easy cases. Easy cases receive less
Preferences Influence Legal Reasoning 164 (2009); Mark A.
Graber, A New Introduction to American Constitutionalism 93
(2013).
273. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the
Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 Vand. L.
Rev. 395, 401–06 (1950).
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attention, because they are less interesting, but American law is topheavy with matters that lawyers decline to take because their
prospective clients’ claims are meritless; matters in which suit is
threatened but never filed, filed but never litigated, or litigated but
never tried, because the law is unambiguous and the outcome clear; and
matters in which trial judges make demonstrable errors, or litigants and
their lawyers have their judgment clouded by emotion, ego, avarice, or
confusion, leading to easy appeals generating unanimous outcomes.274
Structural independence from external sources of interference with
impartial judicial decision-making facilitates the rule of law in easy
cases by enabling judges to uphold and apply the law as they have been
acculturated to do throughout their legal careers, without fear or favor
clouding their judgment.
In the context of easy cases, then, the culturally embedded practice
of taking law seriously helps to justify the traditional role of judicial
independence in a new, Legal Culture Paradigm. In hard cases, the
same analysis sometimes applies. For example, in cases made difficult
because the law is complex or the facts are convoluted, structural
independence buffers judges from external sources of pressure and gives
them the breathing room to get to the bottom of the matter and reach
the correct result. Many difficult cases, however, are made difficult
because the applicable law in relation to the operative facts is not just
complicated—it is indeterminate. In such cases, judges have no choice
but to make new law by filling interpretive gaps in existing law. In the
context of an adversarial system, that typically puts judges in the
position of deciding which of two competing, and often comparably
plausible, arguments yield the sounder interpretation of applicable law.
That is a kind of policy choice requiring discretion and judgment that
can be informed by the judge’s life experience, education, background
(including race and gender), common sense, and ideological orientation,
aided by a strategic appreciation for the political context in which the
law was written and the case arose.
When judges are called upon to make new law in hard cases because
existing law is indeterminate in its application to the facts before the
court, there is no denying that judges make legal policy. And social
science shows that when making legal policy in such cases, judges can
be influenced by their ideological orientations, among other extralegal
274. Richard Posner, for example, has observed that “most cases are routine,”
and that “[t]he routine case is dispatched with least fuss by legalist
methods.” Richard Posner, How Judges Think 46 (2010); see
also Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical
Studies that Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate
Decisionmaking, 58 Duke L.J. 1895, 1897 (2009) (“When the relevant legal
materials are uncomplicated, the issues are uncontroversial, and precedent
is clear, judges’ deliberations are straightforward and judgments are easily
reached.”).

1109

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 3·2021
Judicial Independence at Twilight

factors. This is inevitable. As Professor Stephen Burbank has wisely
observed, law and judicial politics are “different sides of the same coin.
They are not opposites, but rather complements,”275 because extralegal
considerations inform the policy perspectives that judges bring to bear
when acting in a law-making role.
The question then becomes whether judicial “policy-makers,” who
are subject to extralegal influences in their policy-making role, should
receive a measure of independence from popular and political influences
that policy-makers in the legislative and executive branches neither
enjoy nor deserve. The ROLP is helpless to answer this question
because it disavows the notion that independent judges make policy or
are subject to extralegal influence.
The Legal Culture Paradigm, in contrast, accommodates the
empirical realities that the ROLP posits away and answers this question
in the affirmative. The ripple effects of judicial policy-making can be
widely felt, given the precedential effect of court rulings, but the fact
remains that judges are called upon to say what the law is in the context
of specific cases or controversies. The outcome of any given case turns
on the application of law to the particular facts of the case before the
court—facts and law with which the judge is familiar by virtue of the
manner in which the adversarial process supplies judges with the
specifics needed to make an informed decision. What structural
independence enables in hard cases, then, is a judge’s best assessment
of what the applicable facts and law require, unpolluted by external
threats or manipulations—an assessment that the judge is uniquely
situated and fully acculturated to make. Insofar as that assessment
unavoidably requires the judge to “make policy” by determining how
uncertainties in applicable law should be resolved to decide a specific
case before the court, it is fully informed, fact-driven, policy-making
that is better suited to achieve just results on a case-by-case basis than
if the judge was subject to the control of actors less familiar with the
facts or law and concerned only with the outcome.
So conceived, this form of judicial policy-making is inevitable and
unproblematic. In economics, the term “frictional unemployment” is
used to describe the unavoidable percentage of workers who are between
jobs or first entering the workforce, and whose unemployment is a
natural and inevitable part of a healthy economy performing
normally.276 In a similar vein, I would characterize routine judicial law
making in hard cases as frictional policy-making—the place where law
and policy unavoidably converge and require good judges to offer their
best assessment of what the law requires, aided by a range of extralegal
275. Stephen B. Burbank, On the Study of Judicial Behaviors: Of Law,
Politics, Science, and Humility, in What’s Law Got to Do with It?
41, 51 (Charles Gardner Geyh ed., 2011).
276. Ronald S. Warren, Jr., The Estimation of Frictional Unemployment: A
Stochastic Frontier Approach, 73 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 373, 376 (1991).
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considerations (including ideology) that inform their discretion and
judgment. This is not judging gone rogue. It is judging done right.
The Legal Culture Paradigm, then, tweaks the ROLP in two
important ways. First, it explains how a distinct legal culture gives rise
to a default in favor of behavioral independence from internal sources
of interference with impartial judicial decision-making—a default that
structural independence helps to preserve and protect from external
distortion. Second, the Legal Culture Paradigm comes to terms with
legal indeterminacy and the role that a judge’s ideology (among other
extralegal considerations) plays in resolving indeterminate legal
questions, to the end of rejecting the widely discredited premise of the
ROLP that independent judges are impervious to extralegal influences
and do no more or less than follow the law.
The virtue of a Legal Culture Paradigm is that it defends an
independent judiciary in terms consonant with social science and public
perception. The potential vice is that by acknowledging the role
ideology plays in frictional policy-making, the Legal Culture Paradigm
must also acknowledge the risk of gratuitous policy-making, in which
judges abuse their structural independence by disregarding the law
(knowingly or not) that they are acculturated to follow, and effectively
usurping power by imposing their own policy predilections.
Accordingly, the Legal Culture Paradigm must welcome a more robust
role for judicial accountability, relative to the ROLP, to deter
gratuitous policy-making.
Ramping up the role of accountability creates a conundrum.
Behavioral dependence manifested in gratuitous policy-making can be
managed by holding judges more accountable for their internal biases.
Constraining behavioral dependence in this way, however, invites
incursions on structural independence, insofar as those who control the
structures employed to curb judicial bias can misappropriate those
structures to bend judges to their will, on the pretext of constraining
behavioral dependence.
This conundrum is manageable, however, for three reasons. First,
independence and accountability are in a perpetual state of constructive
tension. Striking the optimal balance between them is a fluid process.
Acquiescing to an additional measure of accountability is a reasonable
price to pay for preserving the essential character of an independent
judiciary that Judicial Independence 3.0 has imperiled. One must
therefore accept that preserving the judiciary’s legitimacy with the
body politic necessitates a measure of political-branch oversight. The
nomination and confirmation of federal judges has always been a
partisan, political affair, and in a post-realist age, the continuing
relevance of a judge’s ideology in the appointments process is inevitable.
Defenders of an independent judiciary must likewise accept, if not
embrace, the role Congress plays in regulating judicial bias, by means
of disqualification statutes; financial disclosure laws (which can expose
conflicts of interest that beget bias); the Judicial Conduct and
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Disability Act, which delineates the scope of discipline for judicial mis–
conduct that can implicate behavioral dependence;277 and, in extreme
cases of partiality manifested in bribery or other crimes or corruption,
the impeachment processes.
Second, the proposed Legal Culture Paradigm is compatible with
the existing constitutional structure and the conventions that have
emerged and evolved over time to limit untoward incursions on the
judiciary’s structural independence. The Legal Culture Paradigm thus
embraces customary independence, which will continue to push back
against unwarranted political-branch encroachments on judicial
independence.
Third, the additional accountability that the Legal Culture
Paradigm envisions can be supplied, in large part, by intra-judicial
mechanisms that need not impinge on customary independence. The
judiciary self-regulates for behavioral dependence in myriad ways:
1) appellate review of bias-induced errors;278 2) mandamus actions to
thwart judicial usurpations of power; 279 3) disqualification processes
that force the withdrawal of judges whose impartiality is in doubt;280
4) procedural rules that structure and limit problematic exercise of
judicial discretion;281 5) the Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges, which
regulates judicial partiality and partisan political conduct; 282 6) the
Judicial Conduct and Disability Act, whereby Congress authorized
circuit judicial councils to discipline judges for behavior prejudicial to
the effective administration of the courts;283 7) the oath of office, which
calls upon judges to act impartially and uphold the U.S. Constitution;284
and 8) informal norms among judges desirous of mutual respect on
277. The Act does not regulate conduct related to the merits of rulings that
judges issue, 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(A)(2) (2018), but can address extra–
judicial conduct that casts doubt on the judge’s capacity to serve as an
impartial adjudicator.
278. See, e.g., Marsha S. Berzon, Dissent, “Dissentals,” and Decision Making,
100 Cal. L. Rev. 1479, 1480–81 (2012).
279. Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967).
280. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2018).
281. For example, there are explicit, rule-based constraints on a federal judge’s
discretion to grant dispositive motions for failure to state a claim, summary
judgment, and a directed verdict (“judgment as a matter of law”). Gene
R. Shreve, Peter Raven-Hansen & Charles Gardner Geyh,
Understanding Civil Procedure 212–13, 345, 401–02 (6th ed. 2019).
282. 2 U.S. Courts, Ethics and Judicial Conduct: Code of Conduct for
United States Judges, Canons 3, 5 (2019), https://www.uscourts.gov/
sites/default/files/code_of_conduct_for_united_states_judges_effective
_march_12_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/8P2U-Y43R].
283. 28 U.S.C. §§ 351–64 (2018).
284. 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2018).
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collegial courts, which discourage partisan judging contrary to the rule
of law mission.285 By highlighting the relevance of these mechanisms to
judicial accountability, and reforming some to better serve their
purpose, the judiciary itself can go a long way toward preserving its
autonomy in the transition to a Legal Culture Paradigm.
B. A Litigation-Like Strategy for Restoring Constitutional Conventions

Implementing the proposed Legal Culture Paradigm should help to
meet the challenge presented by eroding support for the ROLP in
Judicial Independence 3.0. But the Legal Culture Paradigm is
inadequate to the task of overcoming the threat to the constitutional
order posed by Judicial Independence 4.0. That is because the Legal
Culture Paradigm depends for its success on preserving customary
independence by respecting constitutional conventions that are being
trashed in the service of dueling campaigns to promote or thwart the
neo-populist wave that is sweeping the United States and much of the
world in Judicial Independence 4.0. It is unrealistic to hope that a
modest reboot of the prevailing paradigm can, by itself, quiet the
polarized, partisan, political fury firing Judicial Independence 4.0,
because the judiciary and its independence have become little more
than pawns subject to sacrifice in a chess game for the future of
American Democracy.
Those seeking to defend or destroy the new populist order are akin
to parties in high-stakes litigation. Litigants in contentious cases often
begin with a period of hardball, followed by a period of growing
receptivity to settlement. A similar sequence of events seems likely here.
Throughout American history, there have been cycles of anti-Court
anger following major transitions of political power, in which holdover
judges of the old regime become targets of the new regime.286 The first
two cycles of the twentieth century were related: the conservative
Supreme Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence thwarted the
legislative agenda of angry Progressives as they ascended to power in
the early twentieth century, just as that same jurisprudence impeded
and infuriated the New Dealers a generation later.287 The end of the
latter cycle was punctuated (in part) by the Supreme Court’s famous
footnote 4 in Carolene Products, where the Court signaled its intentions
to reserve heightened due process scrutiny for cases in which legislation

285. Harry T. Edwards, Collegial Decision Making in the US Courts of Appeals
26–28 (N.Y.U. Sch. L. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Rsch. Paper Series, Working
Paper No. 17–47, 2017).
286. Geyh, supra note 129, at 19–21.
287. See Ross, supra note 127, at 1 (characterizing FDR’s attacks on courts
during the New Deal as a “culmination” of the anticourt sentiment that
began a generation earlier, during the Populist-Progressive era).
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and other state action impinged upon the rights of discrete and insular
minorities.288
The net effect of this pivot was to withdraw the Court from
protecting the property rights of businesses by second-guessing the
wisdom of socio-economic legislation enacted by historically liberalleaning legislatures and to shift the Court’s focus toward protecting the
civil rights and liberties of political minorities against infringement by
majoritarian—and often more conservative—state interests. 289 As a
consequence of this shift, the next three cycles of anti-Court sentiment
featured angry conservatives taking aim at more liberal federal courts:
1) attacks on the Warren Court by state and federal officials, in the
1960s;290 2) the congressional Republicans’ campaign against “liberal
judicial activism” in the 1990s;291 and 3) President Trump’s effort to
discredit “political” decision-making by “Obama judges,” described in
this article.292
These conservative campaigns against liberal judges in the modern
era featured fundamentally different strategies by the partisan
participants. Republicans went on the offensive. They made recreating
the courts as champions of selective “judicial restraint”—whose judges
shared judicial philosophies that were more in keeping conservative
partisan interests—a centerpiece of the Republican agenda dating back
to the Reagan administration.293 It was then, across a series of policy
papers, that the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Policy devised
a blueprint for an ideological regime change in American constitutional
law—a change that could best be implemented through the

288. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
289. See David Schultz, Carolene Prods. Footnote Four, Middle Tenn. State
U.: First Amendment Encyclopedia (2009), https://www.mtsu.edu
/first-amendment/article/5/carolene-products-footnote-four [https://perm
a.cc/3WFW-7WDM] (“Footnote four . . . presages a shift in the Supreme
Court from predominately protecting property rights to protecting other
individual rights . . . . It is arguably the most important footnote in U.S.
constitutional law.”).
290. See William G. Ross, Attacks on the Warren Court by State Officials: A
Case Study of Why Court-Curbing Movements Fail, 50 Buff. L. Rev. 483,
528–52 (2002).
291. Am. Bar Ass’n, An Independent Judiciary: Report of the
Commission on Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence
15–35 (1997).
292. See supra text accompanying notes 246–251.
293. Cass Sunstein, The Right-Wing Assault, The Am. Prospect (Feb. 19,
2003), https://prospect.org/article/right-wing-assault [https://perma.cc/
RP9S-RC53].
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appointments process.294 In the decades since, Republican Presidents
have often shorthanded this ambition in terms of appointing justices in
the mold of Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas. 295 Democrats, in
contrast, adopted a more passive and defensive approach.296 They came
to regard the federal courts as allies in the cause of protecting the rights
that liberals held dear (even after the Supreme Court began its turn to
the right) and, instead of campaigning aggressively to establish a liberal
Court, were content to join moderates in defending the judiciary’s
independence from cyclical, conservative assault.297
The net effect has been a manifestation of what Joseph Fishkin and
David Pozen describe as “asymmetric constitutional hardball,” 298 in
which conservatives have (with exceptions299) tested the limits of inde–
pendence conventions more aggressively than their liberal counterparts.
In that regard, however, Judicial Independence 4.0, beginning with the
Merrick Garland imbroglio and its aftermath, show signs of being a
game-changer. Progressives are awakening to the realization that after
successfully abrogating an array of constitutional conventions, their
conservative adversaries are poised to “win” a generations-long battle
294. See Dawn E. Johnsen, Ronald Reagan and the Rehnquist Court on
Congressional Power: Presidential Influences on Constitutional Change,
78 Ind. L.J. 363, 389–99 (2003).
295. See, e.g., Richard Wolf, Trump’s 21 Potential Court Nominees are
Overwhelmingly White, Male and from Red States, USA Today (Dec. 1,
2016, 7:32 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elec
tions/2016/12/01/donald-trump-supreme-court-21-nominees-list-nomina
tion/93964888/ [https://perma.cc/FJH5-PNY8] (“[Donald] Trump prom–
ised to ‘appoint justices who, like Justice Scalia, will protect our liberty
with the highest regard for the Constitution.’”); Bush Picks Alito for
Supreme Court, N.Y. Times (Oct. 31, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/
2005/10/31/world/americas/bush-picks-alito-for-supreme-court.html [htt
ps://perma.cc/8RUK-K47M] (reporting that Kay Daly, President of the
conservative Coalition for a Fair Judiciary, said, “The president has made
an excellent choice today which reflects his commitment to appoint judges
in the mold of Scalia and Thomas”); Ariane De Vogue, How the
Presidential Election Might Change Supreme Court, ABC News (Nov. 5,
2012, 12:18 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/OTUS/presidentialelection-change-supreme-court/story?id=17644255 [https://perma.cc/A8
KX-2HT4] (“Romney has vowed on his web site to nominate ‘judges in
the mold of Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and
Alito.’”).
296. Sunstein, supra note 293.
297. Id.
298. Joseph Fishkin & David E. Pozen, Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball,
118 Colum. L. Rev. 915, 918–20 (2018).
299. One notable exception being the Democrats’ abuse of process conventions
in judicial confirmation proceedings during the George W. Bush and
Obama administrations. Wheeler, supra note 237.
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for ideological control of the Supreme Court. Sensing a major
jurisprudential regime change,300 progressives have begun to return to
their roots, by launching an offensive in the spirit of their forbearers
from the Progressive and New Deal eras. Most notable in that regard
are serious proposals by leading Democrats to pack the Supreme Court
with additional justices to offset recent Republican gains, in derogation
of longstanding conventions against changing Supreme Court size for
partisan purposes.301
For those who value the role that independence conventions play
in promoting the orderly operation of government generally and the
future of an independent judiciary in particular, things are likely to get
worse before they can get better. Pokes to the eye of established
conventions by conservative partisans will elicit reciprocal pokes by
progressive partisans in lieu of unheeded warnings not to poke at all.
This “eye for an eye” stratagem is very much in the spirit of aggressive,
high-stakes civil litigation, in which both sides strain and sometimes
exceed the limits of applicable rules in scorched-Earth campaigns to
exhaust and intimidate their opponents in pursuit of tactical advantage.
In this environment, calls for compromise and détente will almost
certainly go unheeded. The conservative, neo-populist wave has gained
ground by means of tactics it has no incentive to discontinue.
Progressives, who have lost ground, are in no mood to seek a truce that
entrenches their diminished position. In the immediate future, then, a
period of unrestrained hardball appears inevitable.302
Ultimately, however, scorched-Earth litigation is difficult to
sustain. It becomes so disruptive, so expensive, and so exhausting, that
settlement options begin to look more attractive to both sides. In a like
vein, operating a government in which political branch relationships
with the judiciary are unregulated by conventions portends to become
hopelessly chaotic and dangerously destabilizing. Paradoxically, therein

300. See generally Mark J. Richards & Herbert M. Kritzer, Jurisprudential
Regimes in Supreme Court Decision Making, 96 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 305
(2002).
301. See Everett & Levine, supra note 238.
302. Fishkin and Pozen doubt whether Democrats are fit to play hardball into
extra innings, noting that they have lacked the philosophical and financial
resolve of their Republican counterparts. Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 298,
at 976–82. The accuracy of that prediction may turn on whether Judicial
Independence 4.0 yields the major jurisprudential regime change that
Republicans have been seeking since the Reagan administration. If it does
not, then Fishkin and Pozen are probably right. If, however, we are at a
turning point that culminates in a more significant jurisprudential shift on
the Supreme Court, the history of the left’s protracted assault on the federal
courts during the Populist, Progressive, and New Deal eras suggests that
the Democrats will be playing hardball with sustained intensity into the
foreseeable future.
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lies hope: the more insufferable the unrelenting game of unrestrained
hardball gets, the more attractive the alternative of settlement becomes.
Looking ahead, it is important to begin the business of putting a
structure in place to facilitate the negotiated settlement of differences
between the institutional disputants in anticipation of a time when they
will be receptive to such efforts. A key to enabling a negotiated or
mediated settlement is to bring the parties together in a quieter and
less formal setting, to promote candor and discourage posturing for the
benefit of external audiences.
Separation of powers coupled with checks and balances
entrench inefficiency and conflict in the constitutional design. But the
inefficiency and conflict that the constitution contemplates does not
require isolation or alienation. Since the founding, thoughtful observers
have proposed ways to harness constructive, interbranch engagement
to serve a variety of ends. At the Constitutional Convention, James
Madison proposed a Council of Revision that called upon a body
constituted of the President and federal judges to “examine every act
of the National Legislature before it shall operate.” 303 In the 1920s,
Benjamin Cardozo proposed a Ministry of Justice made up of
representatives from the bench, bar, and academy to assist legislatures
in recommending reforms to improve the administration of justice.304
Many others have offered similar proposals in the years since.305
Congress has established several ad hoc, multi-branch commissions
for the explicit purpose of facilitating effective administration of the
courts. In 1972, Congress established the Commission on Revision of
the Federal Court Appellate System, consisting of members appointed
by the President, the Chief Justice, and both houses of Congress, to
assess the need for realignment of the circuit courts.306 In 1988, Congress
established the Federal Courts Study Committee, with members
appointed by the Chief Justice and drawn from all three branches of
government, for the purpose of identifying problems with federal court
303. James Madison, The Records of the Federal Convention of
1787, at 21 (Max Farrand ed., 1937).
304. Benjamin N. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 Harv. L. Rev. 113, 114,
124 (1921).
305. See e.g., Comm. on Long Range Plan., Jud. Conf. of the U.S.,
Proposed Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts 118 (1995)
(proposing creation of National Commission on the Federal Courts);
William E. Cooper, A Proposal for a Congressional Council of Revision, 12
Seton Hall Legis. J. 233, 238–40 (1989) (proposing council of revision
comprised of former judges and legislators); Larry Kramer, “The One-Eyed
are Kings”: Improving Congress’s Ability to Regulate the Use of Judicial
Resources, 54 L. & Contemp. Probs. 73, 95 (1991) (advocating
establishment of planning agency within legislative branch).
306. Act of Oct. 13, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92–489, 86 Stat. 807.
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operations and recommending solutions.307 In 1990, Congress created
the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal, with
members appointed by leaders from all three branches of government,
to examine issues related to judicial impeachment and discipline, and
recommend reforms.308
Of most immediate relevance, beginning in the late 1970s, the
Brookings Institution hosted a series of conferences in Williamsburg,
Virginia, and elsewhere.309 These conferences brought representatives
from all three branches of government together to discuss court-related
issues for the purpose of improving interbranch communication and
promoting mutual understanding of challenges confronting the
judiciary.310
I recommend that three tri-branch summits be convened in the
spirit of the Williamsburg conferences, when the participants are willing
and receptive to meet. One summit could address core principles: the
paradigmatic role of an independent and accountable judiciary in
American government. A second summit could assess the state of
constitutional conventions that have served to protect an independent
judiciary from encroachment. And a third could examine the
appointments process and the role of procedural conventions in
promoting a stable system of selection and an independent, accountable
judiciary.
At first blush, ending this article with a proposal for the disputants
to get together and talk through their differences would seem to rival
making s’mores and sharing puppy memes as a toothless, anodyne
solution to addressing the debilitating problems that have beset the
American judiciary. But I have analogized this proposal to settlement
talks in high-stakes litigation for a reason. Settlement talks are not
warm and fuzzy affairs. They are intense and fraught, because both
sides are fully aware that their futures are at stake. For that reason,
the concessions that parties make in a negotiated settlement have
purpose and bite. The challenge, which this article has sought to meet,
is to make plain, for the benefit of the disputants, that the stakes are
comparably high in the ongoing partisan battle for the future of the
American judiciary.
By the same token, as in settlement negotiations, the success of
talks between partisans struggling for control of the courts does not
depend on the naïve hope that the disputants will set self-interest aside
307. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702,
§§ 101–09, 102 Stat. 4642, 4644–45 (1998).
308. National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal Act, Pub. L.
No. 101–605, §§ 408–13, 104 Stat. 5122, 5124–25 (1990).
309. See Mark W. Cannon & Warren I. Cikins, Interbranch Cooperation in
Improving the Administration of Justice: A Major Innovation, 38 Wash.
& Lee L. Rev. 1, 11–12, 15 (1981).
310. Id. at 11–19.
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and act for the greater good. As welcome as such displays of patriotism
might be, détente and a restoration of independence conventions can
be achieved with recourse to enlightened self-interest, and the adage,
“what goes around, comes around.” Forging consensus in support of
constitutional conventions proceeds from the self-interested premise
that acquiescing to standard operating procedures, which yields certain
tactical advantages to my opponent when I am in power today, not
only makes life less exhausting and chaotic, but will afford me those
same tactical advantages when I am out of power tomorrow. Support
for judicial independence proceeds on a similar, self-interested premise:
the “optimal” scenario of judges whom I bend to my will when I am in
power today, will yield to the catastrophic scenario of judges whom my
opponent bends to his will tomorrow, unless we settle on independent
judges as the second-best bet for us both. The key, in other words, is
to reorient self-interest in terms that look beyond the next election
cycle.

Conclusion
Judicial independence is in a twilight that can presage the darkness
or herald the dawn. This article offers ample cause for pessimism and
predictions of a dark future for judicial independence, but there is also
cause for guarded optimism. Changes generations in the making, which
have heightened public skepticism of an independent judiciary in the
rule of law paradigm, can be arrested with the gradual introduction of
a new Legal Culture Paradigm. The independence conventions that a
conservative neo-populist President and his progressive (and sometimes
neo-populist) opponents have sought to repudiate can be restored
following a period of turmoil, as the neo-populist movement loses
momentum and the disputants become more receptive to détente.
Darkness may be nigh, but there is room to hope that the dawn will
follow.
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